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INTRODUCTION
Franchising as a system of marketing goods and services has grown
tremendously in recent years. Franchising now accounts for approxi-
mately 90 billion dollars in annual sales or about ten percent of our
country's gross national product.' Ninety percent of the franchise
businesses operating today were established after 1954.
2
A threshold problem in any discussion of franchising is one of defi-
nition: what is a franchise and how is it unique as a marketing system?
One author, Professor Thompson, identifies four elements that set
"franchises" apart from other marketing systems and relationships: 3
1. Although the franchisee may be economically dependent bn the
franchisor, he is a legally independent member of the franchising
system;
2. The franchisee's business is operated with the advantages of name
and standardization of the franchisor accruing to the franchisee;
3. The franchisee's business came into being in its present form (al-
though not necessarily physically), with the expressed purpose of
marketing the franchisor's products or service;
4. A formal agreement, most commonly called a "franchise agree-
ment" or "franchise contract," is in existence. The agreement calls
for a continuing, although not necessarily indeterminate, relation-
ship.
Thompson further identifies two major classes of franchises: product
and service franchise systems, 4 and trademark licensing franchise
systems.5 In the former, the franchisor contributes by license the right
to distribute the franchisor's products under the franchisor's trade
name and trademark.6 Examples include automobile dealerships
(a manufacturer/retailer system) and beverage syrup licenses (a
1. Report of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business on the Impact of Fran-
chising on Small Business, Based on Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural
Economic Development, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1970).
2. Burck, Franchising's Troubled Dream World, FORTUNE, March, 1970, at 117-18.
3. D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND ANTITRUST 7-8 (1971).
4. Id. at 10-11.
5. Id. at 12-17.
6. A retailer does not become a "franchisee" merely because he advertises and sells
a product by use of the manufacturer's trademark. An appliance dealer who advertises
"Acme" washing machines would not pro tanto be an Acme franchisee. The dealer oper-
ates under his own name, his business was not created to sell Acme alone, and there is
no agreement calling for a continuing relationship. A franchisee, on the other hand.
would operate a business in which all four elements set forth by Thompson are present.
See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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manufacturer/wholesaler system). In the latter, the franchisor contrib-
utes by license to the franchisee the right to produce and sell goods or
services under the franchisor's trademark or trade name. In turn, the
trademark franchisor retains the right to control the manner in which
the franchisee conducts his business. Indeed, such control is essential
to the validity of the franchisor's trademark since trademarks function
in part to guarantee the consistent quality of the product identified by
the mark.7 Examples of trademark licensing are motels, day care cen-
ters and fast food establishments.
Trademark licensing franchise systems account for most of the re-
cent growth in franchising and for most of the public attention now
directed toward franchising.8 A recent United States Senate committee
report identifies the following industries as leaders in franchising
growth: "fast food; automobile parts, stores and services; convenience
grocery stores; coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning establish-
ments; motels, and a heterogeneous group of service-type franchises."9
Franchise systems expand in areas where it is advantageous to
combine local operation, financing, and management with national
reputation and national advertising. 10 Franchising offers substantial
7. An owner of a trademark may license others to use it only if he retains the right
to exercise control "in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in
connection with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1970). In times past,
trademarks functioned solely to identify the origin of goods. Hence, the law did not
permit licensing and use of a trademark on goods made by more than one person. Grad-
ually, trademarks acquired a second function-that of warranting the consistent quality
of the goods sold under the mark. Trademarks could be licensed so long as the licensor
continued to control the quality of the goods sold under his mark. D. THOMPSON, supra
note 3, at 13. The Lanham Act of 1946 recognizes trademark licensing and
establishes quality control as its sine qua non. Section 5 provides that "where
a... mark.., is... used legitimately by related companies, such use shall... not affect
the validity of such mark.., provided such mark is not used in such manner as to de-
ceive the public." 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1970). In turn, section 45 defines a "related compa-
ny" as any person who is controlled in respect to the quality of the goods sold under the
mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). See Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1967); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp.; 167 F.2d 484 (C.C. Pa.
1948). See generally Developments in the Law-Trademarks and Unfair Competition,
68 HARv. L. REV. 814, 871-73 (1955).
8. The relative growth patterns of the two types of franchises are illustrated by sta-
tistics supplied by the Small Business Administration on the number of outlets. "Older
franchise groups," mostly product and service systems such as auto dealers and gasoline
stations, accounted for 375,880 outlets in 1969 with a projected increase to 402,100 by
1976, an increase of approximately 7%. "New industry groups," mostly trademark sys-
tems such as fast food and coin-op dry cleaning, accounted for 164,120 outlets in 1969
with a projected increase to 252,900 by 1976, an increase of approximately 54%. Re-
port on the Impact of Franchising, supra note 1, at 29.
9. Id. at 5.
10. D. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 12.
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advantages to both franchisors and franchisees over the most probable
alternative marketing system: vertical integration. 1 The franchisor
obtains a distribution system for his goods, supplies or business plan
and an opportunity to expand his operation with relatively modest
capital investment, since the franchisee generally supplies some por-
tion of the investment capital required for the local operation. The
franchisor can earn substantial income through franchise fees and/or
royalty income.
The franchisee, on the other hand, gains access to an established
brand name, tested marketing techniques, advertising and training
aids. More importantly, the franchisee remains, at least in theory, an
independent businessman. As one judge remarked:' 2
The franchise method of operation has the advantage from the stand-
point of our American system of competitive economy, of enabling
numerous groups of individuals with small capital to become entrepre-
neurs .... If our economy had not developed that system of operation
these individuals would have turned out to have been merely em-
ployees. The franchise system creates a class of independent business-
men; it provides the public with an opportunity to get a uniform
product at numerous points of sale from small independent contrac-
tors, rather than from employees of a vast chain.
Empirical data indicating a lower failure rate for franchised small
businesses than for nonfranchised small businesses substantiates to
some extent these advantages to franchisees.' 3
Franchising may or may not fulfill its promise to be "the salvation
of the 'small independent businessman' "14 and "the last stand against
the creeping octopus of nationwide Mergeritis."'5 What is clear,
however, is that franchising suffers from growing pains-pains attrib-
utable in part to the tardiness of the legal system in its adjustment to
the peculiar problems presented by franchising.
11. Vertical integration is the technique whereby the producer acquires distribution
outlets as an addition to the production entity.
12. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (Dawson, J.),
affd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S.
125 (1965). Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 386 (1967).
13. D. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 33-34 (overall failure rate of 60%, compared to
only 10% for franchisees).
14. Hearings on Franchise Legislation before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., at 513 (1967).
15. Slater, Some Socio-Economic Footnotes on Franchising, I I BOSTON U. Bus. REV.
19, 20 (1964).
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Many of the problems center around two aspects of franchising. 16
The first is the process of selling franchises. Instances of outright
fraud in the sale of franchises continue to plague the industry.' 7 But
fraud aside, the evidence indicates that persons with little or no busi-
ness experience and no access to expert advice make substantial in-
vestments in franchises without the benefit of full and accurate disclo-
sure of the material facts concerning the transaction.18 The second
aspect is the continuing relationship between the franchisor and the
franchisee. The franchisor normally occupies an overwhelmingly
stronger bargaining position and drafts the franchise agreement so as
to maximize his power to control the franchisee.19 Franchisors have
used this power to terminate franchises arbitrarily, to coerce franchis-
ees under threat of termination, and to force franchisees to purchase
supplies from the franchisor or approved suppliers at unreasonable
16. Selling abuses and franchisor coercion do not exhaust the problems with fran-
chising. Other problems not covered by this article include (1) the liability of franchisors
for the obligations of franchisees [see Porter v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 249 Cal. App. 2d
410, 57 Cal. Rptr. 554 (4th Dist. 1967)]; (2) the tax aspects of franchise transactions
[see INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1253; Note, The "Dairy Queen" Cases: A Suggested
Approach to the Taxation of Franchise Sales, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 884 (1967); Comment,
Federal Taxation of Franchise Sales, 44 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1969)]; and (3) the ac-
counting practices of franchisor companies [Goodwin, The Name of the Franchising
Game Is: The Franchise Fee, The Celebrity or Basic Operations?, 25 Bus. LAWYER
1403, 1409-12 (1970); MacKay, Accounting for Initial Franchise Fee Revenue, 129 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 66 (1970)].
17. See Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 650,
652-53 (1971). The Chief Postal Inspector of the U.S. Post Office Department informed
the Senate Select Committee on Small Business that "During the past 5 years, we have
investigated 612 cases of this general type (franchise frauds) which in total have occa-
sioned the loss of over $27 million to investors. A total of 219 convictions [for mail
fraud] have thus far resulted." Report on the Impact of Franchising, supra note 1, at 12
(emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Bessesen, 433 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1970).
18. The Attorney General of New York concluded after an investigation'offran-
chise sales practices in his state: "In almost every instance, the franchise-offering litera-
ture was either inaccurate, misleading, wholly lacking, or blatantly false as to material
facts necessary to making an intelligent investment decision." Report on the Impact of
Franchising, supra note 1, at 13.
19. One study lists 12 areas of franchising managerial activities over which the fran-
chisor normally exercises control: source of products; source of equipment; product
assortment; resale pricing; quality of product or service; facilitating services such as
business hours, credit and delivery; franchisee advertising; sales quotas; training pro-
grams; recordkeeping systems; use of registered trademark; and architectural design of
franchisee's place of business. S. Gillespie, An Analysis of Control in Franchise Distri-
bution Systems, 1966 (unpublished thesis in University of Illinois, Urbana library),
quoted in D. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 45-47. Franchisors may reserve control over
the activity in the franchise contract itself or exercise it more informally through distri-
bution of a detailed policy and operating manual to which all franchisees are asked to
conform. Fear of termination or failure to renew by the franchisor causes franchisees to
conform in general to the franchisor's policies and requirements.
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prices, to carry excessive inventories, to operate long, unprofitable
hours, and to employ other unprofitable practices.2 0
The persistence of these kinds of abuses and grievances creates
pressure for special legislation at both the state21 and federal22 level to
protect the interests of franchisees. In Washington state, this pressure
led to the enactment of a lengthy and detailed statute entitled the
"Franchise Investment Protection Act. '2 3 The Act responds to selling
practices problems with registration, 24 disclosure,2 5 escrow, 26 and
anti-fraud provisions. 27 It responds to the problems of the franchis-
or-franchisee relationship with a "fair practices" or "Franchisee Bill of
Rights" section. 28
This article assesses the role of the Washington Franchise Invest-
ment Protection Act in remedying problems in franchising. First, con-
sideration is given to the adequacy of general remedies presently avail-
able to franchisees for sales practice abuses and franchisor coercion,
apart from Washington's special statute, to determine whether such a
statute is needed. The provisions of the statute are then examined in
detail.
20. See generally H. BROWN, THE REALITIES OF FRANCHISING (1970); H. BROWN,
FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969); Lefkowitz, Franchising Abuses--One
State's Approach, 75 CASE & COM. 13, 15 (1970).
21. Legislation has been proposed in numerous states. See Wall Street Journal, Oct.
11, 1971, at 22, col. 1. California enacted a franchise investment law in 1970 dealing
solely with disclosures and sales practices. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West
Supp. 1972). See generally Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.
J. 1347 (1970); Pennebaker, Franchisors Beivare: A New Franchise Investment Law, 45
L.A.B. BULL. 463 (1970); Comment, A Tempest in a Chicken Basket: Some Reflections
on Franchise Regulation in California, 17 U.C.L.A.L.- REV. 1101 (1970). Delaware en-
acted a statute dealing with the termination of franchises. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§
2551-55 (Supp. 1970). New Jersey enacted a statute dealing with termination, transfers,
and unreasonable restrictions on franchisees. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-1 to -12 (Supp.
1971). Arkansas enacted a statute dealing with royalties and advertising fees charged by
franchisors. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-801 to -806 (197 1).
22. Senator Williams introduced bills in 1970 and 1971 providing for full disclo-
sure in franchise sales. Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970, S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970); Franchise Fair Practices Act of 1971, S. 2399, 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1971). Senator Hart advocates enactment of a "Fairness in Franchising Act" regulating
termination and other franchisor practices. S. 2472, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
23. Ch. 252 [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., as amended, ch. 116 [1972] Wash.
Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
24. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.100.020, .040 (Supp. 1972).
25. Id.§ 19.100.080.
26. Id. § 19.100.050.
27. Id. § 19.100.170.
28. Id. § 19.100.180.
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I. GENERAL REMEDIES-
FRANCHISOR SALES PRACTICES
The practical economics of franchising aggravates the danger of
sales practice abuses. On the one hand, the incentives for a high level
of sales are strong. Sales bring in substantial initial franchise fees that
enrich the sales personnel and inflate the earnings of the franchisor
company. On the other hand, franchises are sold to relatively inexpe-
rienced persons who are investing a high portion of their savings to
obtain a business of their own.29 Buyer caution and resistance to sales
talk are weakened by a general public belief that franchising is the
wave of the future. 30
It should surprise no one, therefore, that exaggerated, misleading,
or false representations and nondisclosure have often accompanied
the sale of franchises. One commentator lists the specific areas of in-
formation most often misrepresented to franchisees: prospective earn-
ings claims; statements that the franchise system is a tested, proven
"going concern" and profit producer; statements that no experience is
necessary; the amount of initial working capital needed; the aids
available from the franchisor to the prospective franchisee; and the
expertise used in compiling and the value of the franchisor's business
manuals. 31
In cases of outright fraud in connection with the sale of franchises,
existing criminal and civil remedies are adequate in theory.3 2 The
problem is one of enforcement. For transactions involving misrepre-
sentation and nondisclosure, existing legal remedies are not adequate.
Three existing sources of possible relief must be considered: (1)
common law remedies for misrepresentation; (2) the application of
29. The Senate Select Committee on Small Business cites a survey by the Attorney
General of New York of more than 10,000 persons who recently purchased franchises.
The survey reveals that 65% previously earned less than $15,000 per year in their prior
occupations. The Committee also notes that minority groups and retired military per-
sonnel are frequent victims of franchise frauds. Report on the Impact of Franchising,
supra note 1, at 13.
30. "In the late 1960's over-optimistic and clearly distorted appraisals of franchising
were spread by a business and consumer press enthusiastically extolling its limitless
growth prospects and glowing, get-rich stories." Axelrad, Franchising--Changing Legal
Skirmish Lines or Armageddon? Some Observations from the Foxhole, 26 Bus.
LAWYER 695, 704 (1971).
31. Id.
32. The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), has been applied to
franchise schemes; See note 17 supra.
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state and federal securities laws; and (3) the application of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
A. Common Law Remedies for Misrepresentation
Common law remedies for misrepresentation hold only limited
promise as a cure for franchise sales abuses. They are inadequate for
many of the same reasons that long ago led state legislatures and
Congress to conclude that common law remedies are inadequate to
cure analogous abuses in the sale of securities. 33 The common law
remedies tend to be redressive rather than preventive, and they require
only truth in statements volunteered, not affirmative disclosure of all
material information. 34
The three basic common law remedies are damages for breach of
warranty, damages for deceit, and rescission. Warranty probably
plays as small a role in the sale of franchises as it does in the sale of
securities.35 In a typical trademark license franchise, the franchisor
warrants by implication only his title to the trademark; there is no
implied warranty of quality or value. Because the typical franchise
agreement contains an integration clause to the effect that "no repre-
sentations, inducements, promises or agreements (except duly exe-
cuted written agreements) between the parties hereto which are not
embodied herein ... shall be of any force or effect," 36 the parole evi-
dence rule would seem to be a major obstacle to warranty recovery for
exaggerated promises and representations made during the sales nego-
tiations. Since warranty is a contractual action, the plaintiff-franchisee
is bound by the integration clause, 37 and franchisors are undoubtedly
careful to keep inflated claims and predictions out of the written
agreement. Should a franchisee prove a breach of warranty, however,
the measure of his damage recovery would be governed by the
"loss-of-bargain" rule.3 8
33. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44, 1624-31 (2d ed. 1961);
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
34. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 695-96 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. But cf. Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wn. 2d 621, 393 P.2d 287 (1964);
Oates v. Taylor, 31 Wn. 2d 898, 199 P.2d 924 (1948) (dicta); PROSSER § 106, at 698.
35. See Shulman, supra note 33, at 230.
36. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 127 (1969) (from a sample
dealer's franchise agreement currently in use).
37. L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1626.
38. Id. at 1628-29. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
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The parole evidence rule is no obstacle to recovery for deceit since
an award of damages for deceit is a remedy sounding in tort.3 9 But the
required "elements" of a cause of action for deceit present difficult
problems of proof. These elements are:40
(1) representation of an existing fact; (2) its materiality; (3) its falsity;
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his intent that it shall be
acted upon by the person to whom it is made; (6) ignorance of its
falsity on the part of the person to whom the representation is ad-
dressed; (7) the latter's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8)
his right to rely upon it; and (9) his consequent damage.
The requirement that there be a misrepresentation of a material
fact will often be an obstacle to the franchisee. Statements of opinion
are not considered "facts" but mere puffing and salemanship. Hence,
for example, a franchisee will have difficulty recovering for inflated
predictions about future earnings from the franchise. On the other
hand, statements of intention are considered facts. 41 Hence recovery is
possible for failure to deliver the franchise on time or failure to
provide special training and services if the franchisor did not in fact
intend to fulfill his promises. Justifiable reliance on an opinion is a
well established exception to the "puffing rule, '42 but such reliance
has traditionally been difficult to prove. However, the general trend of
the law is away from "caveat emptor" and toward allowing buyers to
rely without extensive investigation on statements by the seller.43 The
element of scienter or knowledge of the falsity by the franchisor may
again be difficult to prove although a number of jurisdictions have
eliminated the strict scienter element and others view it as satisfied if
the seller made the statement without any belief as to its truth or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.44
39. Id. at 1626.
40. Gray v. Wikstrom Motors, 14 Wn. 2d 448, 455-56, 128 P.2d 490, 492-93 (1942).
41. PROSSER § 109, at 720-31; Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957; Part
Il, 34 WASH. L. REv. 467, 520-22 (1959); see, e.g., Neff v." Western Cooperative
Hatcheries, 241 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1957).
42. PROSSER § 109, at 726.
43. Id. § 108, at 714-20. The reliance element has been most relaxed in cases where
the defendant was far more experienced in the area than the plaintiff. Boonstra v. Ste-
vens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wn. 2d 621, 393 P.2d 287 (1964). This is inevitably the case with
a franchisor and prospective franchisee.
44. PROSSER § 107, at 701. Prosser notes a trend in decisions to eliminate the
scienter requirement in damage actions for misrepresentation. Id. at 710-14, citing inter
alia, Jacquot v. Farmer's Straw Gas Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 P. 984 (1926);
Pratt v. Thompson, 133 Wash. 218, 233 P. 637 (1925).
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Proof of damage may be a formidable task for the franchisee who
has been induced by false representations. The American decisions are
split between two measures of damages in a tort action for deceit. 45
The "out-of-pocket" rule measures the plaintiffs recovery by the dif-
ference between the value of what he has parted with and the value of
what he has received. If the franchisor can successfully argue that
despite the misrepresentations the franchise is worth what the fran-
chisee paid for it, he escapes liability under the "out-of-pocket" rule.
The "loss-of-bargain" rule measures the plaintiffs recovery by the dif-
ference between the actual value of what he has received and the
value of the franchise if it had been as represented. This rule normally
is more favorable to the plaintiff and has been adopted by a majority
of American jurisdictions, including Washington. 46 However, since all
franchises are unique, and their value is set by innumerable and vari-
able market factors, the franchisee-plaintiff may still be unable to
show damage even under the "loss-of-bargain" rule. For example, the
impact of failure to provide sufficient training as represented upon the
franchisee's earnings would be difficult to show.47
Of the three common law remedies, rescission can most easily be
established. Misrepresentation of a material fact upon which the buyer
relied is sufficient; 48 the franchisee need not show scienter on the part
of the franchisor 9 nor a causal connection between the misrepresen-
tation and any damage suffered. The parole evidence rule does not
preclude proof of the misrepresentation, and recovery is measured by
a restitution standard. Two obstacles to restitution, however, are the
twin doctrines of laches and ratification. If an unsophisticated and
uncounseled franchisee continues to operate the franchise and pay
royalties to the franchisor after discovering the misrepresentation, res-
cission may be denied. 50
In general, the common law remedies fail to meet adequately the
45. PROSSER § 110, at 733-36.
46. Salter v. Heiser, 39 Wn. 2d 826, 239 P.2d 327 (1951).
47. However, if the fact of damage is clear, the courts do not let uncertainty as to
the amount stand in the way of recovery. Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d
915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967).
48. L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1627. Washington takes the position that innocent
misrepresentation is sufficient for rescission, although some cases continue to use
"fraud" language. Shattuck, supra note 4 1, at 523.
49. In a number ofjurisdictions, including Washington, innocent misrepresentation
may also give rise to a cause of action for damages. See note 44 supra.
50. Cf. Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wn. 2d 131, 143, 234 P.2d 884, 891 (1951).
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problem of franchise sales abuses. The prospect of liability undoubt-
edly restrains some franchisors, but the remedies can be pursued only
through litigation, the expense of which may be too great for many
franchisees. Further, none of the three remedies is available for simple
nondisclosure by franchisors of material information.
The general rule is that a party dealing at arm's length with another
need not disclose material information.51 An exception to this rule is
expressed in section 551 of the Restatement of Torts:52 "One party to
a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated.., such
matters as the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence between them." It can be
argued that such a relation of confidence does exist between fran-
chisor and prospective franchisee; pfospective franchisees are typi-
cally inexperienced in business matters and rely on the superior
knowledge and experience of the franchisor. Whether in fact the
common law does impose such a fiduciary duty of affirmative disclo-
sure on franchisors is unclear.5 3
B. State and Federal Securities Acts
The state and federal securities laws are specifically designed to
curb sale practice abuses in the securities industry that are in many
respects comparable to those that exist in franchising. Securities laws
contain mandatory registration provisions54 which require sellers of
securities, unless expressly exempted, to file a registration statement
with an administrative agency that makes a preliminary assessment of
the adequacy of disclosure by the seller.55 The laws then require that
prescribed information be provided to prospective purchasers of the
securities in the form of a prospectus or offering circular.56 The pur-
51. PROSSER § 106, at 695-96; cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551 (1938).
52. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1938).
53. Compare Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967),
with Asheim v. Pigeon Hole Parking, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 320, 328-29 (E. D. Wash. 1959).
54. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). WASH REV. CODE §
21.20.140 ( 1959).
55. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 6-8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77h (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§
21.20.210, 230, 280 (1959). Persons participating in the distribution of securities are
also subject to registration requirements as broker-dealers. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.040-.135 (1959).
56. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(10), 5(b), 10(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(10), 77e(b), 77j(a),
(1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.230 (1959).
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chaser has an express civil remedy for any false or misleading infor-
mation in the prospectus or circular.57 Finally, the laws prohibit gen-
erally any false or misleading statement or omission in connection
with the sale of the securities. 58
Whether the securities laws can be applied directly to the sale of
franchises depends on a very fundamental question: is a franchise a
"security"?59 A security is statutorily defined in both state and federal
securities laws to include a long list of things such as any "note,"
"stock," "evidence of indebtedness" or "investment contract. '60 The
term "investment contract," which is not defined, is perhaps the
broadest category and the only one that might subsume the typical
franchise. Despite the similarity in statutory definitions, state law has
in some instances taken a more expansive view of "investment con-
tract" than federal law in the area of franchises.
1. Franchises as Securities under Federal Law
In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 61 the United States Supreme Court
definitively construed the term "investment contract" in the federal
securities laws. The Court announced: 62
[A] n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party ....
In Howey, land sales contracts involving small tracts of orange groves
57. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430
(1959).
58. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1970); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1959). Both state and federal
decisions have implied private civil remedies for violations of the antifraud prohibi-
tions. Supt. of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971);
Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970).
59. See generally Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement
as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including l0b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAWYER
1311 (1969); Note, Franchises and Founders' Contracts: Securities or Not? 8 IDAHO L.
REV. 146 (1971); Comment, The Franchise Agreement: A Security for Purposes of Reg-
ulation, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 130; Note, Franchise Regulation Under the California Cor-
porate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 140 (1968).
60. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.005(1I) (1959).
61. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
62. Id. at 298-99.
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were held to be investment contracts and hence securities. The tracts
were offered along with a service contract, and the purchasers, who
were nonresidents, obviously had no intention of cultivating the
groves themselves.6 3 The common enterprise and reliance-solely-on-
the-efforts-of-others tests were thus met.
With franchises, the Howey requirement that the anticipated profits
come solely from the efforts of others has been hard to satisfy since
the typical franchise contemplates the active participation of the fran-
chisee-investor. Accordingly, a number of lower courts have held that
franchises are not investment contracts or securities. 64 The agency
charged with administration and enforcement of the federal securities
laws, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has also indi-
cated that it does not consider most franchises to be securities, prefer-
ring to leave federal regulation of franchising to the Federal Trade
Commission.6 5
Some commentators argue that the "solely" part of the Howey test
should not be applied so literally.66 The requirement should exclude
from coverage of the securities acts only those investors who have
practical and actual control over the business and an opportunity to
protect their investment. Such active entrepreneurs are not as apt as
passive investors to fall prey to misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and
fraud, the prevention of which is the purpose of securities laws. With
many franchises, however, the participation of the franchisee is only
ministerial. In franchises of the "mom and pop" variety, the fran-
chisee-investor is inexperienced in business and relies upon the fran-
63. Although prospective purchasers were technically free to make arrangements
with other service companies, the sales literature stressed the superiority of the company
connected with the offeror of the tracts. Id. at 295. Hence, the tracts and the service con-
tract were functionally parts of a single investment package.
64. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969) (discus-
sion of federal and Washington State securities acts); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King
Int'l, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,603 (M.D. Fla. 1972); McCoy v. Convenient Food
Mart, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 73,873 (D. Neb. 1972); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L.'REP. 92,838 (D. Colo. 1970), affd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th
Cir. 1972); Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., CCH. FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,293 (D.D.C. 1968).
65. Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcomm.
on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small
Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 706-11 (1970) (testimony of Mr. Loomis, General
Counsel of the SEC).
66. Goodwin, supra note 59, at 1318-21. See also Long, An Attempt to Return "In-
vestment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulations, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135
(1971).
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chisor to take charge of the business affairs of the franchise venture.
Thus, the franchisor may choose the site or design of the building,
arrange the purchase of equipment and supplies, hire the manager or
assistant manager, set the hours of operation, set prices, and make
other management decisions. The franchisee may be prohibited from
advertising independently or selling additional products or services.
Such nondiscretionary participation should not exclude the franchise
from being a security since the degree of control dictates that the suc-
cess of the franchise outlet is dependent to an overwhelming degree
upon the good will toward the franchise generated by the franchisor.
To date, neither the SEC nor the federal courts have been disposed
to distinguish managerial from ministerial participation in determining
whether a franchise is an investment contract. 67 However, a recent
SEC release dealing with multi-level distributorships may indicate a
more flexible approach to the non-participation requirement of
Howey. The SEC states:68
The existence of a security must depend in significant measure upon
the degree of managerial authority over the investor's funds retained
or given; and performance by an investor of duties related to the en-
terprise, even if financially significant and plainly contributing to the
success of the venture, may be irrelevant to the existence of a security
if the investor does not control the use of his funds to a significant de-
gree. The "efforts of others" referred to in Howey are limited, there-
fore, to those types of managerial efforts but for which the anticipated
return could not be produced.
Whether this approach will be applied to franchises generally remains
to be seen.
67. E.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., supra note 64.
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971) (emphasis added). The
SEC's campaign against multi-level distributorships and pyramiding schemes recently
bore fruit in a decision of a district court in Oregon which held that the "adventures"
offered by Glen Turner's Dare To Be Great, Inc. were securities. SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,606 (D. Ore. 1972). The adven-
tures offered buyers the opportunity to make money by recruiting additional partici-
pants. While the buyers were asked to find prospects, the court held that these efforts
were qualitatively insignificant to the success or failure of the enterprise which turned
primarily on the defendant's efforts and the extent to which the market had been satu-
rated. For a discussion of the Franchise Act's ban on chain distributorship schemes, see
notes 458-61 and accompanying text infra.
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2. Franchises as Securities under State Laws
Most state courts follow the Howey definition of an investment con-
tract.6 9 Hence the active participation by the franchisee in many states
bars the arrangement from being a "security" for purposes of state
securities laws. For example, in Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King,70
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that investments in a multi-level
marketing program did not constitute a security since the investors
realized profits from their own efforts in recruiting people into the
program as well as from the efforts of third parties.71
In order to avoid the nonparticipation barrier and include at least
some franchises within the ambit of the securities laws, some states
have adopted the so-called "risk capital" or "separate business risk"
theory. The theory originated in an opinion by the Attorney General
of California in 1967.72 The opinion concludes that where a fran-
chisee is to participate in the franchised business only nominally in
exchange for a share of the profits, a security is involved, and where
the franchisee participates actively and the franchisor provides goods
and services, no security is involved unless "the franchisor intends to
secure a substantial portion of the initial capital that is needed to
provide such goods and services from the fees paid by the franchisee
or franchisees. '73 If the franchisee is supplying risk capital to the
franchisor,74 he is in effect making an investment in the franchisor's
business of supplying goods and services, a business venture separate
from the franchised business in which he participates.75
69. E.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 641 (9tl Cir. 1969)
(interpreting the Securities A'ct of Washington).
70. 452 S.W.2d 531 (1970).
71. Accord, Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841
(1968).
72. 49 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 124 (1967).
73. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
74. A difficult problem with the risk capital test is to determine when in fact fran-
chisees are providing risk capital. Following the Attorney General's opinion, the Cali-
fornia Corporations Commissioner issued guidelines that provided that an implication
will arise that a franchise is a security unless the franchisor can show: (1) adequate cap-
ital to operate the franchising program for an indefinite length of time, without the ne-
cessity of resorting to the funds to be contributed by the franchisee; (2) successful busi-
ness operation in the past; and (3) adequate facilities to administer the franchising
program successfully. An exemption was provided for franchisors having a "net worth of
not less than $500,000 immediately prior to the sale of a franchise." Cal. Div. of Corps.
Bull. No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
75. An Oregon court recently adopted the risk capital test as a supplement to the
Howey test for construing "investment contract." Oregon ex rel. Healy v. Consumer
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In 1969, the Attorney General of the State of Georgia adopted the
California risk capital theory and embellished it with his own "inte-
grated risk" concept.76 Under the integrated risk concept, security
status is not avoided by mere adequacy of the franchisor's initial cap-
ital: "All franchise systems, however capitalized, are susceptible to
securities regulation until such time as the franchise is so well estab-
lished as a system that success or failure of an individual franchise is
not disproportionately keyed to the success or failure of the other
franchisees. ' 77 The Georgia Attorney General concludes that the fran-
chisor will have to "provide a sufficient number of franchisor-owned
and operated outlets to establish the system as a going enterprise
without dependence upon the individual activities of the franchisee's
co-franchisors [sic], or the franchisor will have to comply with the
registration requirements" for the sale of securities.78
Both the risk capital and integrated risk tests are ingenious methods
of eluding the Howey nonparticipation requirement. They are, how-
ever, at best truncated approaches to the problem of franchise sales
practice abuses. Such abuses are not confined to the new or thinly-
capitalized franchising operations that are subject to regulation as
sales of securities under those tests.79 Full, fair, and accurate disclo-
sure should be enforced in connection with the sale of all franchises.
Two approaches to an integrated regulatory treatment of franchise
sales are available. The first is to treat all franchises as securities by
softening or rejecting the Howey nonparticipation requirement and
broadening the concept of "investment contract." The Supreme Court
of Hawaii took a significant step in this direction in State v. Hawaii
Market Center, Inc.80 While the case involved so-called "founders'
Business System, Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 554 (Ore. App. 1971). The Attorney General of
Utah also adopted the risk capital test. 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,893 (January 7, 1971).
76. 1969 Op. GA. ATT'y GEN. 661; 3 CCH. BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,850 (Nov. 14,
1969).
77. Id. at 665.
78. Id. The Attorney General's opinion may not be supported by Georgia case law.
See, e.g., Georgia Market Center, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969)
(applying the Howey formula, but noting that it should not be adhered to with such
strictness that a mere token participation in an enterprise would prevent the contract
from being classified as a security); accord, Goldsmith v. American Food Serv., Inc.,
123 Ga. App. 353, 181 S.E.2d 95 (1971).
79. Note, Regulation of the Franchise as a Security, 19 J. PUB. L. 105, 126 (1970).
80. 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). See also D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, 3 CCH
BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,897 (Dist. Ct. Denver 1971); Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v.
Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. App. 1969), aff'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
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contracts,"81 the court chose to define a "security" for the purposes of
the state's securities act broadly, possibly broadly enough to include
virtually all franchises. Following the analysis of Professor Coffey,8 2
the court held that an investment contract is created whenever: 83
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's prom-
ises or representations which give rise to a reasonable under-
standing that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation
of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and ac-
tual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
The second approach is to exclude all franchises from being defined
as securities but to enact a disclosure statute or administrative regula-
tion that is especially tailored to meet the problems of franchising.
California, which attempted to regulate the sales of some franchises as
securities, subsequently abandoned the effort when it enacted a "Fran-
chise Investment Law. '8 4 With the enactment of the Franchise In-
vestment Protection Act, the State of Washington has now adopted
this approach.
C. Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce."85 As it has been developed by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the substance of this prohibition
is potentially a strong weapon against franchise sales practice abuses.
While the FTC has shown considerable interest recently in the problems
8 1. See generally Note, Franchises and Founder's Contracts: Securities or Not?, 8
IDAHO L. REV. 146, 152-56 (1971). A founder's contract has been described as a contract
whereby a person can become a founder-member by purchasing certain merchandise at
inflated prices and by additionally executing an agreement stating that the purchaser
may by several methods earn income.
82. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. Rav. 367 (1967).
83. 485 P.2d at 109.
84. Stats. 1970, ch. 1400, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000 et seq. (West 1971).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), (6) (1970).
309
Washington Law Review
of franchising, questions remain as to the efficacy of its procedures and
enforcement tools.
The substantive standards of misrepresentation developed under sec-
tion 5 are broader than common law concepts of fraud and deceit.8 6 It is
sufficient that the representation, considered in context, has the capacity
or tendency to deceive an ordinary purchaser or even an ignorant, un-
thinking and credulous purchaser.87 Nondisclosures as well as affirmative
misstatements can constitute a deceptive practice if an overall misleading
impression is created.88
The FTC has proceeded against a number of franchisors for viola-
tions of section 5 in connection with sales practices. For example, in
International Sales Co.,8 9 the FTC provisionally accepted a consent
order prohibiting two firms from overstating franchisees' potential
earnings, misrepresenting that the necessary experience and training
would be provided, misrepresenting that top sales-producing locations
would be found for franchisees, and misrepresenting that the firms
would repurchase or help resell the business if the purchaser wished to
leave it. And in Century Brick Corp. of America,90 a consent order
prohibited five affiliated firms from falsely claiming that (1) they had
many successful dealers earning from $20,000 to over $50,000 per
year; (2) the dealer would get an exclusive sales territory and would
be paid if other dealers were permitted to do business in it; (3) they
would pay all expenses for the dealer or his employee to visit and re-
ceive training at their home offices; and (4) they would provide
dealers with free installation of machines, sales leads, and advice and
assistance whenever needed.
The amount of protection against franchise sales practice abuses
that the FTC can offer is dependent upon the resolution of two ques-
86. See generally Comment, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005.
1038-63 (1967).
87. Id. at 1040-43 (and cases cited therein).
88. Id. at 1047-51.
89. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,663 (FTC June 22, 1971). The consent order also
required that the firms:
(1) write into all contracts that they may be cancelled by written notification within
three days and that they are not final and binding until respondents have placed
merchandise in locations satisfactory to the customer; (2) submit a report to the
Commission each year for three years after the initial compliance report, de-
scribing all customer complaints received during the previous year that involve the
prohibited practices and explaining the disposition of each complaint.
Id.
90. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,391 (FTC Oct. 27, 1970).
310
Vol. 48: 291, 1973
State Regulation of Franchising
tions concerning the scope of its enforcement authority. The first
question relates to the FTC's authority under section 5 to promulgate
detailed rules and regulations that can have the force of law. The
case-by-case approach to franchise abuses suffers from some of the
same defects of the common law remedies: it tends to be remedial
rather than preventive and does not supply comprehensive disclosure
standards. The FTC has recognized the need for such standards by
giving notice of a "Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Involving Disclo-
sure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising." 91 The
Rule lists 27 items of specific information that franchisors must pre-
sent to prospective franchisees in a statement.92 It prohibits certain
kinds of earnings predictions and any claim made without sufficient
substantiation, and it requires a three-day "cooling-off' period fol-
lowing execution of the franchise agreement during which the fran-
chisee is free to cancel without penalty.
The proposed rule is excellent in conception, but whether it can
have the force of law and be binding in adjudication is not clear. The
FTC explains the force of its Trade Regulation Rules as follows:
"Where a trade regulation rule is relevant to any issue involved in an
adjudicative proceeding thereafter instituted, the Commission may
rely upon the rule to resolve such issue, provided that the respondent
shall have been given a fair hearing on the applicability of the rule to
the particular case." z93 Although the FTC has not been given specific
"legislative" rule making authority by the Federal Trade Commission
Act, section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act does empower
the FTC "from time to time to classify corporations and to make rules
and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions" of the
Act.94 But arguably this section confers authority only to issue proce-
dural and interpretative regulations.9 5
One commentator suggests that the best approach to this problem
91. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 38,029 (Nov. 10, 1971).
92. The substance of the items is discussed in connection with the disclosure provi-
sions of the Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act. See notes 370-96 and
accompanying text infra.
93. FTC General Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 1.12(c) (1972).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 46g (1970).
95. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C.
1972) (appeal pending), holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act does not confer
upon the FTC the authority to promulgate Trade Regulations that have the effect of sub-
stantive law. The court held that section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
"conveys only the authority to make such rules and regulations in connection with its
houskeeping chores and investigative responsibilities." Id. at 1348.
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of implied legislative rule-making authority is to determine in each
statute whether "it is rational and fair to permit the determination to
be made in a binding general regulation or to require that the issue
remain open in each case." 96 Applying this test to the FTC's authority
in the area of misrepresentation, the commentator concludes that
since fraud is "traditionally outlawed by statutes or general regula-
tions, and the likelihood of variation from case to case of the merits of
defined types of advertising ... is not great," the FTC should have
implied authority to issue binding regulations protecting against mis-
representation. 97
The second question concerning the scope of the FTC's enforce-
ment authority relates to the remedies it can invoke.98 The FTC only
has power to enter a "cease and desist" order prohibiting prescribed
future conduct. 99 Since no actual penalties are imposed until the re-
spondent is found in a subsequent judicial proceeding initiated by the
Department of Justice to have violated the order,100 violators are al-
lowed at least one "free bite." Since the FTC lacks authority to seek a
preliminary injunction, the respondent may continue the alleged un-
fair practices during the long investigatory and adjudicatory period.101
Finally, it is unclear whether the FTC has authority to require that
restitution be paid to victims of deceptive practices.1 02
96. Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
781, 801 (1965).
97. Id. at 803-04.
98. See generally Comment, supra note 86, at 1063-1101.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(1) (1970).
100. Violation of a cease and desist order carries a penalty of not more than $5000
for each violation. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970).
101. It may be noted that the FTC's jurisdiction is limited by the requirement that
only those deceptive practices that are "in [interstate] commerce" are unlawful. 15
U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(1) (1970). However, the interstate commerce requirement is
rarely an obstacle in the case of franchising since most franchisors sell franchises in
more than one state with similar sales tactics and literature. Such activity is sufficient
to fulfill the "in commerce" requirement. Guziak v. FTC, 361 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1966).
102. It has long been assumed that the FTC lacks authority to order restitution or
other relief to a private party. The FTC was created to remedy public, not private,
wrongs. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929). In a recent proceeding, however, the FTC
claimed authority to order restitution in dicta. Curtis Publishing Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,719 (FTC June 30, 197 1). It indicated that such relief would be appropriate where
"the retention of the money or property of consumers may be deemed to be a con-
tinuing violation of Section 5, separate and apart from any misrepresentation or decep-
tive sales scheme which may be utilized by the seller." This may be the case where a con-
sumer has been deceived into paying value for something "either worthless or of only
token value." Subsequent to the Curtis dicta, a FTC hearing examiner ordered restitu-
tion in a franchise fraud case though personally doubting the FTC's authority. Seattle
Times, March 14, 1972, at D8, col 3.
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A bill introduced to the Ninety-Second Congress entitled the "Con-
sumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act" would significantly expand the express powers of the FTC
in the area of deceptive practices. 103 First, it would expand the FTC's
jurisdiction to all activities "affecting commerce."'104 Second, it would
grant the FTC power to seek preliminary injunctions.105 Third, it
would grant the FTC power to initiate court actions for civil penalties
against those engaged in any act with actual knowledge or knowledge
fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is
unfair and deceptive and is prohibited by section 5.106 Fourth, it
would grant the FTC power to seek through court action specific re-
dress for consumers injured by unfair or deceptive acts or practices.'07
Finally, the Act would grant the FTC power to "issue procedural and
interpretive rules defining with specificity acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive to consumers." 108
The FTC can play an important role in the prevention of franchise
sales practice abuses. Stringent federal standards for disclosure in
franchise sales will overcome the reluctance of states to adopt tough
regulations for fear of deterring the entry of new franchise businesses.
However, even if the FTC's powers are enlarged by the proposed
Improvement Act, and it adopts the proposed Trade Regulation Rule,
a role remains for state legislation in the area of franchise sales prac-
tice abuses. The Federal Trade Commission Act still would not
provide a private civil remedy enforceable in court upon the initiative
of the franchisee alone. 10 9
II. GENERAL REMEDIES-
UNFAIR PRACTICES BY FRANCHISORS
A fair consensus can be gathered for the proposition that the law
ought to deter and remedy misrepresentations and nondisclosures in
connection with the sale of franchises. No such consensus is possible
103. Title II, S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (as amended).
104. Id. §§ 201, 205, 209.
105. Id.§ 210.
106. Id. § 202.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 206.
109. Another recent bill in Congress would allow private class actions by con-
sumers based on violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. S. 984,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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for the idea that the law should go further and intervene to alter the
balance of bargaining power between franchisee and franchisor. Fran-
chisors cling to the principle of "freedom of contract": the law places
the responsibility for making a definite agreement upon the parties,
and courts enforce contracts with little power to alter their terms.
Franchisees, on the other hand, claim that unquestioning adherence to
freedom of contract allows franchisors to abuse their power to control
the franchisees' businesses. Thus, franchisees urge that courts be au-
thorized to review the fairness of the substance and use of powers re-
served by franchisors regardless of the terms in the franchise agree-
ment.
Criticism of franchisor practices stresses two areas of alleged abuse
of the franchisor-franchisee relationship: (1) arbitrary exercise of
powers of termination, and (2) unjustified control over franchisees'
sources of supply.1 0
Termination provisions in franchise agreements are of two types.
An agreement for a product and service franchise may specify no du-
ration at all, or may be terminable at will or on short notice by the
franchisor. 1" Trademark licensing franchises, on the other hand,
normally are granted for a set number of years since they initially in-
volve payment of a substantial franchise fee. However, the franchise
agreement usually expressly grants the franchisor the right to terminate
in the event of any breach by the franchisee of any of the provisions
of the franchise agreement."12 Since the typical franchise agreement
imposes a myriad of detailed requirements, a franchisee is likely to be
continually in breach and hence subject to termination by the fran-
chisor. In either instance, critics argue that the franchisee, being in
constant fear of termination, is subject to coercion and unfair treat-
ment by the franchisor. 113
110. These two complaints do not exhaust the list of unfair practices. A Senate re-
port cites "failure by the franchisor to live up to his promises" and "unprofitable man-
datory working hours imposed upon the franchisee" as other frequent abuses. Report on
the Impact of Franchising, supra note 1, at 13-14. See text accompanying notes 404-56
infra.
111. See, e.g., Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720,
304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969) (service station dealership terminable on 30 days' notice
during first year, on 90 days' notice thereafter).
112. See, e.g., H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 114, 124-25 (1969)(fast food franchise for 20 years terminable if dealer fails to observe any term of the
agreement).
113. Comment, A Tempest in a Chicken Bucket: Some Reflections on Franchise
Regulation in California, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1101, 1111-12 (1970).
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The consequences of termination to the franchisee are harsh. The
franchisee loses the value of the goodwill toward the franchisor's
product or service, even though the goodwill may be partly attribut-
able to the franchisee's own efforts. Also, the franchisee may be left
with inventory and supplies that are of.no value except in connection
with the terminated franchise. Finally, the franchisee may be bound
by a covenant not to compete with the franchisor in the area.114
Trademark licensing franchisors typically control their franchisees'
sources of supply;115 the franchisee must either buy supplies from the
franchisor or from approved sources of supply. The stated reason is to
maintain quality control, but critics claim that such rigid controls in
fact serve merely to enrich the franchisor in the form of unreasonably
high prices for supplies and "kick-backs" from suppliers." 16
A number of possible sources of relief from alleged termination and
control of supply abuses will be examined in order to assess the im-
pact of remedies available to franchisees under the new Washington
Franchise Investment Protection Act. 1 7 The examination includes an
analysis of common law and Uniform Commercial Code contract
principles, state and federal automobile dealer "day-in-court" acts,
and the federal antitrust laws.
A. Common Law and Uniform Commercial Code Protection
Against "Unfair Practices"
1. Termination
The common law offers franchisees little solace from arbitrary or
unfair terminations by franchisors."18 A franchise of unspecified dura-
114. Such a clause will generally be included if the franchisor provides the physical
plant for the business. The clause will provide that for a specified period of time after
termination and within a certain distance from the franchise location, the franchisee will
not engage in the same or similar activities. The clause is often applicable regardless of
the cause for termination. A franchisee has a strong case against the enforceability of
such a clause if the franchisee is terminated without good cause and if the franchisee
does not receive full compensation for the value of the business as a going
concern. H. BROWN, supra note 112, at 40.
115. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 416-25 infra.
117. See text accompanying notes 404-57 infra.
118. See generally, Horton, Legal Remedies of a Distributor Terminated Pursuant
to a Contractual Provision of Termination upon Notice, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 88
(1969); Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code-Mixing Classified and
Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. LAWYER 1075 (1967).
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tion is construed to be terminable at will.119 If the franchise specifies
the conditions under which the franchisor may terminate, he may ex-
ercise that right without any showing of good faith or fairness to the
franchisee:' 20
Dealers doubtless accept these one sided contracts because they think
that the right to deal in the product of the manufacturer, even on his
terms, is valuable to them; but, after they have made such contracts,
relying upon the good faith of the manufacturer for the protection
which the contracts do not give, they cannot, when they get into trou-
ble, expect the courts to place in the contracts the protection which
they themselves have failed to insert.
The courts refuse to intervene to correct any imbalance in power be-
tween the parties to a franchise agreement:1 21
To attempt to redress this balance by judicial action without legislative
authority appears to us a doubtful policy. We have not proper facili-
ties'to weigh economic factors, nor have we before us a showing of the
supposed needs which may lead the manufacturers to require these
seemingly harsh bargains.
Apparently only one state, South Carolina, has adopted a contrary
position and imposed limitations on the exercise of express powers of
termination. In Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tires
Store,'22 the court concluded that a franchise or dealership "may not
119. E.g., Mayflower Air-Conditioners, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Supply, Inc., 54
Wn. 2d 211, 339 P.2d 89 (1959) (terminable at will subject to giving reasonable notice);
National Grocery Co. v. Santaella & Co., 160 Wash. 262, 295 P. 128 (1931); see gener-
ally 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1017A (3rd ed. 1967); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196
(1968). The Uniform Commercial Code provides that a contract of indefinite duration is
valid "for a reasonable time" and termination must be with "reasonable notification."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-309.
Under the "Missouri Doctrine" followed by some courts, "franchise agreements in-
volving... a substantial investment by the dealer and existing for an indefinite duration
cannot be terminated until after a reasonable period of time has elapsed." Gellhorn,
Limitations on Contract Termination Rights--Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J.
465, 479-81 (and cases cited); see also Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352,
437 P.2d 892, 894 (1968) (dicta that franchise of indefinite duration terminable only for
unsatisfactory performance). The idea is to give the dealer an opportunity to recoup his
investment. The Missouri Doctrine offers only limited protection to franchisees, how-
ever. It does not apply if a reasonable period has elapsed already or if termination con-
ditions are expressly stated in the agreement.
120. Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmajer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1932).
121. Buskwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir.
1940); accord, Rubinger v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 193 F. Supp. 711, 718
(1961).
122. 161 S.C. 487, 159 S.E. 825, 826 (1931). Philadelphia Storage Battery was fol-
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be terminated, if the manner of termination be against equity and
good conscience." In a recent federal decision applying the law of
South Carolina, the court noted that the Philadelphia Storage Battery
standard of conduct is "far more stringent than one forbidding only
actual fraud, and it may apply to an unconscionable reason for termi-
nation as well as to the causing of needless injury in the course of ter-
mination.1123 The federal court also observed that South Carolina
"may have anticipated a national trend," citing sections 2-309 and
1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code.124
A number of common law contract doctrines ameliorate possible
harsh effects of unlimited powers of termination. If the agreement is
silent as to notice, the courts may require notice within a reasonable
period prior to termination in order to give the dealer or franchisee
time to make other arrangements. 25 Also the franchisee may be able
to rely upon waiver or estoppel to preclude a franchisor from alleging
a default by the franchisee of the type which the franchisor has ig-
nored in the past. 26 Finally, the franchisor's attempt to retain the en-
tire franchise fee as liquidated damages upon termination of the fran-
chise for cause may be held void as a penalty.127 However, these doc-
trines do not alter the basic common law right to terminate in accord-
ance with the provisions of the agreement.
lowed in Gaines W. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.S.C.
1960). In J.L Case Co. the court concluded:
With the background of Harrison's long and faithful representation of Case, the
refusal to renew the dealership unless Harrison would invest a large amount of
money in tractors which he did not want and would agree not to deal in any com-
petitive line of tractors could, and evidently was, found by the jury to be so arbi-
trary as to lack "equity and good conscience" within the principle of the Philadel-
phia Storage Battery Case.
Id. at 253.
123. deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971).
124. Id. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-309(3) invalidates certain unconscionable
terminations, and section 1-203 imposes an obligation of "good faith" in the perform-
ance or enforcement of every contract or duty governed by the Code.
125. Mayflower Air-Conditioners, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Supply, Inc., 54 Wn. 2d
211, 339 P.2d 89 (1959). The Uniform Commercial Code provides that in a contract of
indefinite duration "an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation
would be unconscionable." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-309. Compare Mastran v.
William Freihager Baking Co, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 988 (E.D. Pa. 1968), with Sinkoff
Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1966).
126. Gellhorn, supra note 119, at 486-89.
127. Cf. Lee v. Bergesen, 58 Wn. 2d 462, 364 P.2d 18 (1961). In Educational Bene-
ficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (197 1), the court held invalid
as a penalty a "non-refundable enrollment fee" which a computer school was to retain
regardless of when a student dropped. The fee bore no rational relationship to any
damage the school might sustain. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(1).
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Franchisees subjected to termination might seek to rely upon the
doctrines of good faith and unconscionability found in article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. By its terms article 2 applies only to
"transactions in goods, ' 128 which would not seem to cover many
franchise arrangements. 129 However, courts have applied Uniform
Commercial Code provisions outside its domain by analogy, rea-
soning that the provisions should be given the same consideration as
case authority. 130
The Uniform Commercial Code imposes a general obligation of
good faith in the performance of contracts.' 31 This requirement is of
little assistance to the franchisee who has been terminated according
to the express terms of the franchise agreement. In Division of Triple
T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., the court held that the UCC's
good faith requirement "merely relates to the honesty imposed upon
the parties during the term of the contract .... Consequently, unless
the termination clause be deemed unconscionable there is no implicit
requirement that it be exercised other than as provided for in the con-
tract."132
The Code also provides that a court may either refuse to enforce a
contract or clause of a contract which it finds to have been uncon-
scionable at the time it was made or it may limit the application of an
unconscionable clause to avoid any unconscionable effect. 133 There is
little indication, however, that the principle of unconscionability will
be used extensively to remedy unfair terminations of franchises. The
comment to the Code stresses that " [t] he principle is one of the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise.., and not of disturbance
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." 134 In
view of this purpose, the court in Triple T Service held that a provi-
sion allowing an oil company to terminate an automobile service sta-
128. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
129. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(1) defines "goods" as "all things (in-
cluding specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities ... and things in action."
130. E.g., Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
131. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203. The Code states: "'Good faith' means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Id. § 1-201(19).
132. 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 201 (1969).
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(l).
134. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
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tion dealership upon 30 days' notice was not unconscionable. 35 Fur-
ther, the code requires the court to consider the conscionability of the
contract in the light of its "commercial setting, purpose and effect."136
Termination clauses in the franchise industry are relatively uniform
and overwhelmingly favorable to the franchisor.
Commentators have urged that the doctrine of unconscionability be
applied expansively in order to develop minimum standards of fair-
ness for termination of dealerships and franchises. For example, Pro-
fessor Gellhorn argues that the courts should scrutinize the reason-
ableness of a contract term the breach of which is the basis for an at-
tempted termination, 37 weigh the effect of termination upon the fran-
chisee with the effect of continuation upon the franchisor, 138 and take
a flexible approach to remedies. 139 Gellhorn urges that his suggestions
do not really involve any radical departure from traditional contract
law principles, but rather are a mere extension of the kinds of in-
quiries courts have long made in judging whether liquidated damages
provisions are in fact invalid as penalties. 140 Gellhorn also feels that
case-by-case adjudication based on minimum standards of fairness is
preferable to any elaborate and inflexible legislative rules on franchise
termination such as have now in fact been adopted in Washington.' 4 '
No court decision to date has used either the common law or the Uni-
form Commercial Code doctrine of unconscionability to create a stan-
135. 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
136. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2).
137. Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancella-
tions, 1967 DUKE LJ. 465. According to Gellhorn, the courts, in testing the reasonable-
ness of terms, should require that "the condition which 'creates' the right to terminate the
agreement in one party must bear a reasonable relationship to the risks sought to be al-
located and the benefits granted by the agreement." Id. at 512. For example, a fran-
chisor who charges a high initial franchise fee and receives a small royalty should not
be able to terminate a franchise for low sales volume since the franchisee bears most of
the risk of substandard sales. Id. at 514.
138. In testing the effects of a particular termination, the courts should inquire
"whether the harm which will or is likely to result to the terminated party from enforcing
the termination provision is proportional to the harm which will or is likely to result to
the terminating party if the provision is not enforced." Id. at 517-18. Thus, the court
might weigh the expected loss to the franchisee of being ousted from business and the
expected loss to the franchisor as a result of continuing the allegedly substandard fran-
chisee.
139. For example, the courts may be reticent about forcing upon a franchisor an
unwanted relationship but could condition the franchisor's right to terminate upon his
offer to repurchase the franchisee's specialized equipment and inventory. Id. at 519-20;
cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)0) (Supp. 1972), discussed at notes 452-57 and
accompanying text infra.
140. Gellhorn,supra note 137, at 511-21; see note 127supra.
141. Gellhorn, supra note 137, at 506-07; see notes 452-57 and accompanying text
infra.
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dard of fairness in franchise termination such as Professor Gellhorn
suggests.
2. Control of Sources of Supply
A franchisee required by the franchise agreement to purchase sup-
plies from the franchisor or approved sources at unreasonably high
prices can look to two possible common law remedies. The first is the
doctrine of unconscionability discussed in connection with termina-
tion. More promising, however, is the law of fiduciary duties and its
prohibition of realizing secret profits from a relationship of trust.
The leading case applying the law of fiduciary duties to franchising
is the decision of the High Court of Justice of Ontario in Jirna, Ltd. v.
Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd.142 Under the agreement, the plaintiff
franchisee was required to purchase "all ingredients and commodities"
from the dealer or dealer-approved sources. During the negotiations
for the franchise, the franchisee was assured that it would benefit from
the mass purchasing power of the franchising organization. It was not
disclosed to the franchisee that the franchisor would profit in any
fashion from the franchisee's purchases of supplies. In fact, the fran-
chisor negotiated secret agreements with approved suppliers to receive
rebates from 5 percent to 20 percent.
The franchisee sued for an accounting of all rebates received by the
franchisor. The court granted the relief. Despite the clause in the
agreement that the "relationship between the parties is only that of
independent contractors," the court found that a relationship of trust
and confidence in fact existed. The franchisor retained almost total
control over the franchisee and invited the franchisee to trust its
greater experience. From this relationship of confidence flowed a fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty on the part of the franchisor-including a duty
to account for any secret profits derived from the relationship.
The Canadian court did not purport to establish any new legal
principles: "[T] here is nothing new in the principles sought to be
imposed. Surely all that is being done is simply to make a new appli-
cation of a well-recognized principle."' 43 It relied on familiar deci-
sions, including that of Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon. 44
142. 13 D.L.R. (3d) 645 (1970).
143. Id. at 655.
144. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (holding that "[]oint adventurers, like
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One commentator asserts that the courts have relied upon three fac-
tors in classifying relationships as fiducial: (1) "pervasive powers held
by one party"; (2) "gross disparity of the parties in a complex transac-
tion usually of long duration"; and (3) "rampant opportunities for
abuse, particularly through clandestine self-preference. '145 All three
factors are present in many franchise arrangements. If a franchise is
deemed to involve a fiduciary relationship, the franchisor would be
restrained not only from retaining secret rebates but also from em-
ploying a wide variety of other unfair practices. 146
While no reported American decision has yet accepted fully the no-
tion that a franchise imposes fiduciary duties on the franchisor,- no
decision has squarely rejected the notion either. Common law fidu-
ciary duties of loyalty thus remain a potential source of relief from
unfair practices by franchisors. 147
B. The Automobile Dealers Day-in-Court Act
Since the common law offers franchisees minimal aid in altering
the balance of bargaining power with franchisors, it is no surprise that
franchisees have sought refuge in legislation. Automobile dealers were
the first to do so successfully. Although the Automobile Dealers
Day-In-Court Act of 1956148 applies to only a small segment of fran-
copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of finest loy-
alty"). Id. at 546.
145. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 650, 655
(1971).
146. Id. at 670-72. Another commentator is skeptical: "[T] his theory of trust law
seems even more unwieldy, limited and difficult for a plaintiff than common law fraud."
Goodwin, The Name of the Franchising Game Is: The Franchise Fee, The Celebrity or
Basic Operations? 25 Bus. LAWYER 1403, 1405 (1970). No reasons for this conclusion
are given.
147. In addition to common law fiduciary duties, Washington's statutes prohibiting
"corrupt influencing of agents" and "grafting by employees" may provide a source for
attacking rebates and kick-backs to franchisors. The statutes make it a misdemeanor for
any person to "offer... any compensation... to any agent... with intent to influence
his action in relation to his principal's ... business" and for any agent to "ask or
receive.., any compensation... upon any agreement.., that he shall act in any partic-
ular manner in connection with his principal's business; or, being authorized to
purchase... supplies... for his principal .... ask or receive... a commission.., from
any person with whom he may deal in relation to such matters." WASH. REV. CODE §§
49.44.060-.070 (1959). It is possible to argue that a franchisor who arranges for and des-
ignates a source of supply for a franchisee is in effect acting as agent for the franchisee
and hence prohibited from receiving a kick-back. See generally, Comment, Control of
Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 852-56
(1960).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970).
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chisees, the accumulated experience of 16 years under the Act offers
insights into the likely impact of a more general franchisor good faith
statute such as section 18 of the Washington Franchise Investment
Protection Act.
The Automobile Dealers Act was enacted because of persistent
complaints by dealers that they were subject to unfair practices such
as unreasonable sales quotas, forced purchases of unwanted cars and
accessories, and restrictions on transfers of franchises. 149 Employees of
the manufacturers enforced these practices under express or implied
threats to exercise the manufacturer's contract right to terminate the
dealership upon short notice or for unsatisfactory performance.
The Act authorizes a dealer to bring suit in federal court to recover
damages resulting from the manufacturer's failure to act "in good
faith in performing . . . terminating . . . or not renewing the fran-
chise."'150 The manufacturer can defend by showing "the failure of the
dealer to act in good faith," 151 which is defined as the duty to act "in a
fair and equitable manner ... so as to guarantee the one party
freedom from coercion or intimidation [or threats thereof] ... from
the other party. ' 152 "Recommendation" or "argument" does not con-
stitute a lack of good faith. 53
As to the initial construction question of whether the statutory stan-
dard of "good faith" is to be limited to lack of "coercion" or whether
the statute imposes a duty of general fairness on the manufacturer, the
courts adopted the former interpretation confining the statutory
remedy to acts of "coercion." 154
149. See generally, BROWN, supra note 112, at 77-86; Kessler & Stern, Competition,
Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959); Kessler, Automobile Dealer
Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957); Note, Statutory
Regulation of Manufacturer-Dealer Relationships in the Automobile Industry, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 1239 (1957).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970).
151. Id.
152. 15U.S.C.§ 1221e(1970).
153. Id. The line between a mere "recommendation" of a course of action and a
"threat" to terminate for failure to follow the recommendation is, of course, a fine one.
Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1970); Note, supra note 149,
at 1250.
154. E.g., Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964); Globe Motors,
Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3rd Cir. 1964); Milos v. Ford Motor
Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir. 1963).
The record of cases filed under the Dealers Act reflects this restrictive definition of
"good faith." A 1965 study of 90 cases filed indicates that 24 were settled, 21 did not
reach the trier of fact, 7 resulted in verdicts for the manufacturer, and 6 resulted in ver-
dicts for the dealer (5 of which were set aside by judicial action). See Macaulay,
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In applying the statutory remedy, the courts recognize two princi-
ples: (1) the Act was not intended to create another remedy for mere
breach of contract;1 55 and (2) merely showing valid reasons for termi-
nating the franchise will not insulate the manufacturer from liability if
those reasons are pretexts for coercion. 156
The approach to the "coercion" issue has been first to examine the
provisions of the franchise agreement that have been enforced against
the dealer. If the provision imposed by the manufacturer is "reason-
able, objective and nondiscriminatory," then its enforcement does not
constitute coercion. 157 Several decisions have distinguished two types
of conditions:158 (1) those that "benefit only, or primarily, the manu-
facturer"; 159 and (2) those that "work to the mutual advantage of both
parties." The former are "particularly suspect.' 160
A wide variety of conditions have survived challenge, including
requirements that the dealer (1) submit monthly financial statements,
(2) maintain satisfactory and competitive business facilities, (3) meet
reasonable minimum sales responsibilities, (4) provide reasonable
working capital, (5) advertise in a certain way and hire more sales-
men, (6) devote full time to the business, (7) relocate his facilities, and
(8) obtain approval of any transfer of the dealership. 161 On the other
hand, a recent decision held that "termination for failure to adhere to
a manufacturer's suggested resale price to dealers" states a good cause
of action under the Dealers Act. 162 Another decision found "coercion"
Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who
Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System--Part
II, 1965 Wisc. L. REv. 740, 742-49 (1965). Dealers have fared somewhat better since
1965, recovering substantial monetary judgments in a number of cases: E.g., York
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 447 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1971); Auto-
west, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc. 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970); Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 622 (3rd Cir. 1969).
155. Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3rd Cir.
1964). Cf. Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970) (a dealer must
prove something more than threat to terminate lawfully).
156. York Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 447 F.2d 786, 791 (5th
Cir. 1971): "The Dealers Day in Court Act contemplates a cause of action even upon
the assertion of legal rights if there is failure of good faith in the exercise thereof."
157. Macaulay, supra note 154, at 762-73.
158. Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1970); Volkswagen
Interamericana v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 442 (lst Cir. 1966).
159. See Autowest, supra note 158, at 561. Examples are requirements that a dealer
purchase large stocks of vehicles and parts or maintain a low gross profit margin.
160. Id. at 561. Examples of the latter are requirements that a dealer improve its
service or managerial efficiency.
161. See cases cited in York Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 447
F.2d 786, 793 n.8 (5th Cir. 1971).
162. Autowest, supra note 158, at 561.
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established by both the manufacturer's refusal to supply automobiles
unless the dealer ordered unwanted models and by his refusal to credit
the dealer for services performed under warranty arrangements. 163
After examining the fairness of the franchise terms, the courts ex-
amine whether the franchise was administered fairly.164 As Professor
Macaulay observes, "manufacturers' personnel who see dealers and
make decisions about the quality of their performance have some dis-
cretion, and discretion can be abused."'165 Dealers have had little suc-
cess in establishing that they have been victims of a personal vendetta
unrelated to legitimate business considerations because of the diffi-
culty of presenting adequate evidence of the alleged "plot."'166 Fur-
ther, it is not enough to show merely that manufacturers' personnel
took personal pleasure in terminating a dealership for otherwise good
cause.
167
Where a manufacturer's lack of good faith has been shown, the
courts have taken a flexible approach to remedies. In awarding dam-
ages based on loss of future profits, the decisions apply the principle
that "the wrongdoer should bear the risk of uncertainty that his own
conduct has created."'168 Though the Dealers Act authorizes suits to
"recover the damages ... sustained" and does not mention equitable
relief,169 the courts have implied the power to issue injunctions against
wrongful termination. In affirming a temporary injunction, a recent
opinion noted that the hardship to the manufacturer of continued
operation of the franchise during litigation is rarely proportionate to
the hardship suffered by a terminated dealer. 70 Damages are often an
inadequate remedy; dealers want "to sell automobiles, not to live on
the income from a damages award.' 71 If the balance of hardships tips
strongly toward the dealer, he need only show on the merits that seri-
163. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967).
164. See Macaulay, supra note 154, at 773-79.
165. Id. at 774.
166. See, e.g., Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964).
167. See Macaulay, supra note 154, at 775.
168. See, e.g., Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 565 (2d Cir. 1970);
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967); cf. Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251, 264-65, rehearing denied, 327 U.S. 817 (1946).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970).
170. Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1204-07 (2d Cir.
1970) (dealer granted temporary injunction despite evidence that dealer had defrauded
manufacturer).
171. Id. at 1205.
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ous, substantial, difficult, and doubtful questions as to the termination
exist in order to obtain a temporary injunction.' 7 2
The experience under the Automobile Dealers Act teaches that the
courts are apt to be cautious in the application of any franchisor good
faith legislation. They fear the adverse economic consequences to the
consuming public of any guarantee of tenure to an inefficient fran-
chisee.173 Yet that experience also teaches that the courts can under
legislative mandate develop minimum standards of fair treatment of
franchisees whose independent livelihoods depend on the continuation
of their franchised businesses.
C. The Federal Antitrust Laws
Franchisees frequently have resorted to litigation based on the fed-
eral antitrust laws in their quest for remedies for alleged unfair prac-
tices by franchisors. The purpose of the antitrust laws is the preserva-
tion of competition, not individual competitors.' 7 4 Hence a franchisee
has no antitrust remedy for an allegedly arbitrary termination or a
threat of termination by a franchisor pursuing its own self-interest.175
The franchisee may have such a remedy, however, if the franchisor's-
actions are taken in order to enforce agreements or practices that are
themselves contrary to the antitrust laws.' 7 6
Since the statutory prescriptions of the federal antitrust laws are
very general and stated in terms of the effect of a practice on competi-
tion, the antitrust restraints on franchising have been evolving slowly
through case-by-case litigation. The litigation centers on the right of
franchisors to control such matters as the franchisee's prices and
sources of supply,' 77 the products and services the franchisee may or
172. Id. at 1205-06.
173. See Kessler & Stem, supra note 149, at 107-10.
174. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
175. E.g., Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Schwing Motor Co.
v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956), affd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.
1956).
176. E.g., Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) (allegations
that franchisors of convenience grocery stores combined to restrain trade through tie-ins
and price-fixing, that franchisors required franchisees not to buy goods from competi-
tors, and that franchisors attempted to monopolize the wholesale and retail grocery busi-
ness were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of antitrust violations).
177. E.g., Wurzberg Brothers, Inc. v. Head Ski Co., 276 F. Supp. 142 (D.NJ.
1967); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afJ'd, 332 F.2d 505
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must offer, 178 and the territories and customers with whom the fran-
chisee may deal.179 Competing public interests must be balanced. 80
On the one hand, there is a public interest in free intrabrand competi-
tion in franchised goods or services and in unhampered competition
for input supplies. On the other hand, there is a public interest in vig-
orous interbrand competition. Stressing the latter, franchisors argue
that if they are unable to exercise extensive control over franchisees,
the only alternative will be more costly vertical integration. This will
create barriers to entry into the industry and hence lessen the compe-
tition in that industry. Recently, however, the interest in intrabrand
competition seems to have attained the upper hand.' 8 '
1. Tying Agreements and the Chicken Delight Case
With trademark licensing franchise systems, 8 2 the major antitrust
problem is the legality of franchisor control over the franchisee's
sources of supply. The antitrust approach is now literally incorporated
by reference into Washington law since the new Franchise Investment
Protection Act allows only "reasonably necessary" controls over a
franchisee's sources of supply and directs the courts to be "guided by"
decisions under the antitrust laws in determining whether such con-
trols are legal. 183
Franchisor control over the franchisee's sources of supply runs into
the antitrust doctrine prohibiting "tying arrangements." A tying ar-
rangement is defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or
tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
(2d Cir. 1964); see generally Garlick, Pure Franchising, Control and the Antitrust Laws:
Friends or Foes?, 48 J. URBAN L. 835 (1971).
178. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357 (1965).
179. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
180. See generally D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND ANTITRUST 143-47
(1971).
181. E.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (territorial
restraints incident to private brand system illegal per se under section I of the Sherman
Act despite evidence that system enhances competitive position of independent grocers
against chains).
182. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)(b) (Supp. 1972). See text accompanying
notes 416-25 infra.
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from any other supplier. '184 A tying arrangement may run afoul of
either section 3 of the Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act. 185
In assessing the competitive impact of tying arrangements, the Su-
preme Court has relied upon the "leverage theory": "They [tying
arrangements] deny competitors free access to the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage
in another market.' 8 6 Thus the theory is that tying may enable the
seller to extend his power or monopolistic position in the market for
the tying product over into the market for the tied product. At least
one commentator has argued forcefully and at length that the Court's
leverage theory does not make sense in economic terms and that tying
arrangements should be declared legal except under unusual circum-
stances. 87 Nevertheless, the Court has not abandoned the leverage
theory. 188
In a recent decision, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,189 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the prohibition
of tying arrangements to a trademark licensing franchisor's control
over his franchisee's sources of supply. Siegel was a treble damage
antitrust class action brought by franchisees of Chicken Delight, a
fast-food franchisor. The action challenged the legality of require-
ments in the standard franchise agreement that franchisees purchase
from Chicken Delight (1) cooking equipment, (2) dip and spice mixes,
and (3) trade-mark bearing paper packaging. In the trial court, the
judge directed a verdict for the plaintiffs as to the packaging tying
184. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
185. Section 3 of the Clayton Act specifically prohibits "sale of goods.., on the
condition... that the... purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods.., of a
competitor.., of the.., seller, where the effect of such.., sale... may be to substan-
tially lessen competition .. " 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
hibits generally "every contract... in restraint of trade .. " 15 U.S.C. § I (1970). Sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act is limited to sales of goods. Hence tying arrangements in-
volving services and intangibles must be judged under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Although the Supreme Court at one time indicated that a higher standard of proof was
required to invalidate a tying arrangement under section 1 than under Clayton Act sec-
tion 3, Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), the distinction
has not been emphasized in later cases. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1(1958).
186. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
187. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, Part II: Tie-ins,
Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE LJ. 195 (1970).
188. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969).
189. 448F.2d43 (9thCir. 1971).
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arrangement, and the jury found for the plaintiff as to the cooking
equipment and dips and spice mixes. 190 The judgment was affirmed
on appeal although a limited new trial on the issue of damages was
ordered.
In affirming the judgment, the court rejected several objections
raised by Chicken Delight to the application of the tying prohibition.
First, Chicken Delight claimed that its trademark franchise is not an
item separate from the packaging, mixes and equipment. Rather, it
offers a single package, the Chicken Delight franchise system. The
court of appeals held otherwise, relying upon the change in the con-
ception of a trademark from a "strict emblem of source" to a "repre-
sentation of product quality." The "goodwill of the Chicken Delight
trademark does not attach to the multitude of separate articles used in
the operation of the licensed system." 19' Therefore, the franchise was
held to be a distinct tying product. Second, Chicken Delight claimed
that it did not have the necessary economic power in the market for
the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the mar-
kets for the tied products, stressing the large number of fast-food fran-
chises, including chicken franchises, in business. The court of appeals
rejected this claim, reasoning that Chicken Delight's unique trade-
mark together with its demonstrated power to impose tying arrange-
ments justified a directed verdict on the issue.
Chicken Delight claimed that its requirements, even if they
constituted tying arrangements, could be justified as reasonable re-
straints on three different grounds. Chicken Delight first contended
that the "arrangement was a reasonable device for measuring and col-
lecting revenue"---presumably meaning that any excess over the fair
market value for the supplies was royalty to Chicken Delight for li-
cense of the franchise. The court rejected this contention because
there is "no authority" for it and because other means of collecting
revenue exist-such as royalties based on sales volume or fees com-
puted per unit of time. Chicken Delight next contended that when it
first entered franchising it was a new business entitled to impose tying
arrangements under the "critical new business period" doctrine of
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.192 and that transition to dif-
190. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 448
F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
191. 448 F.2d at 49.
192. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). In
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ferent arrangements would not be feasible. The court held that the
Jerrold defense expired after Chicken Delight became an established
franchise.
Finally, Chicken Delight contended that the tying arrangements
were necessary for purposes of quality control and marketing identity.
The court of appeals held that a requirement imposed in the interest
of quality control and uniformity must be the "less restrictive alterna-
tive" available. Such an alternative would be written specifications of
the type and quality of the supplies to be used. 193 Hence the trial court
correctly directed a verdict for the plaintiffs on the question of justifi-
cation as to paper packaging since the printing and color were "easily
specifiable." Chicken Delight asserted that its dip and spice mixes
yielded a distinct flavor and were trade secrets and that its cookers
prepared food in a special manner. Hence the justification for these
tying arrangements turned on disputed fact questions which were
submitted to the jury. The court of appeals affirmed without extended
discussion the jury's verdict that specification was practicable.
Chicken Delight is probably a correct decision, given the Supreme
- -- C-urt's clear indication of hostility toward tying arrangements and its
acceptance of the leverage theory. Hence, the Chicken Delight court
cannot be faulted for failing to require inquiry into the actual eco-
nomic impact of Chicken Delight's arrangements such as whether a
surcharge on certain supplies is more or less restrictive on competition
at the retail level than a royalty on gross sales. If Chicken Delight is
followed in other circuits, it bodes ill for direct franchisor control over
sources of supply. A prior decision by the Second Circuit, Susser v.
Jerrold the defendant sold highly complex community antenna television systems. It
sold the systems only as a whole and on condition that Jerrold install and service the
system. The court held that both practices, though tying arrangements, were nevertheless
legal during the initial period when Jerrold was launching a "new business with a highly
uncertain future." Quality control and customer satisfaction were critical during this
period. After the Jerrold system became established, however, the justification for the
tying arrangements ceased.
193. The rule that quality control cannot justify a tying arrangement unless specifi-
cations are not feasible originates with language in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949): "The only situation, indeed, in which the protection of good
will may necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute
would be so detailed that they could not practicably be supplied." The dictum was ap-
plied in Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (lst Cir. 1961),
where the court held that the defendant's requirement that purchasers of an unloading
device also purchase the defendant's glass-lined silo was justified by seven years of
unsatisfactory experience with selling unloaders alone with specifications.
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Carvel Corp.,1 94 indicated that quality control might be a broad de-
fense available to franchisors, especially in the area of food franchises
where taste is "so insusceptible of precise verbalization" and specifica-
tions may be impossible to administer for hundreds of franchisees.
Chicken Delight indicates that quality control is not so talismanic and
is a question for factual inquiry in each case in which it is alleged as a
justification for tying arrangements.
The extent of the recoverable damages inflicted upon franchisees by
the illegal tying arrangement was a difficult question in Chicken De-
light. The franchise agreements specified no franchise fee or royalty
payments. Chicken Delight argued in the trial court that any damages
represented by overcharges for the tied supplies should be reduced by
the reasonable value of the Chicken Delight trademark license. The
trial court rejected this argument but was reversed by the court of
appeals which reasoned that the parties could not have intended that
the license be granted literally free of charge. The court remanded for
a new trial on damages, which were to be measured by the difference
between the amount of the overcharge for the tied products and the
value of the tying product (the franchise). The court rejected Chicken
Delight's argument that the fair value of the franchise must necessarily
be equal to the amount of the overcharges since the franchisees were
willing to pay the latter to obtain the former: 195
The franchisees' apparent willingness to pay the ultimate cost of the
arrangement is clouded by the fact that they may well have been
unaware of what that cost would come to in practice. Had the full
amount of the over-charge on the tied items been openly specified as
the cost of the tying items, agreement might not have been forthcoming.
The court of appeals' approach to the damage issue in Chicken
Delight casts light on the real purpose that is served by applying the
antitrust prohibition of tying arrangements to franchisor control over
franchisee sources of supply. Though the courts speak of preserving
competition in the market for the tied product, it is beyond belief that
Chicken Delight's control over its franchisees' source of paper packag-
ing, for example, would have any significant effect on competition in
the vast paper and printing industry. In fact, the prohibition of tying
194. 332 F.2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964).
195. 448 F.2d at 52-53.
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serves to protect the franchisee by forcing the franchisor to specify his
compensation in a clear and open manner.
2. Injunctions Against Franchise Terminations
A treble-damage recovery for an antitrust violation' 96 by the fran-
chisor is an enticing prospect for franchisees. Often, however, franchis-
ees are equally interested in preventing the termination of their busi-
nesses by the franchisor. Two recent decisions illuminate the prospects
of a franchisee pressing antitrust claims against his franchisor and
obtaining injunctive relief against termination. In Helfenbein v. Inter-
national Industries, Inc.,197 franchisees sought an injunction against
their eviction from leased franchise premises on the ground that the
leases required illegal tie-in agreements. They also sought to stay a
pending arbitration that was to determine the amount owed by the
franchisees to the franchisor for franchise fees, rent, equipment use,
and goods and services furnished. The court denied a temporary in-
junction and stay of the arbitration even though the plaintiffs offered
to pay the amounts due for rent, franchise fees, and services (the items
other than the goods which were allegedly tied illegally) should they
be granted an injunction against arbitration and eviction. The court
felt that the plaintiffs were attempting to use their refusal to pay past
due accounts coercively to impose their position on the legality of the
tie-in requirements and to involve the court in the coercion.
To be contrasted with Helfenbein is Milsen Co. v. Southland
Corp.198 The franchisees brought suit against the franchisor seeking
relief from illegal price fixing and tying requirements. Noting that the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the franchisor was
engaged in illegal practices, the court granted a temporary injunction
conditioned only on the franchisees keeping current the rent due for
use of the franchise premises. During the litigation the plaintiff-
franchisees did not have to continue paying the prescribed fran-
chise fees for various services by the franchisor. The court found that
the franchisor was using a fee-rebate system to enforce its tying ar-
rangement for dairy products and also was not attempting to collect
196. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
197. 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971).
198. 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971).
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the full franchise fee unless the franchisee failed to purchase dairy
supplies from the franchisor's designated source. Hence the franchise
fees and the antitrust violations were connected. Following Chicken
Delight, the court held that the franchisor could offset against any
damages a reasonable value of the franchise.
Neither Helfenbein nor Milsen takes what normally would seem to
be the appropriate approach to interim relief in antitrust suits by fran-
chisees. If the plaintiff-franchisee makes a prima facie case of antitrust
violations by the franchisor, the court should temporarily enjoin the
franchisor from continuing the practices or terminating the franchise
for the franchisee's failure to abide by illegal terms. Equitable relief is
usually justified since the balance of hardship weighs heavily in the
franchisee's favor and the damages caused by improper termination
would be impossible to determine with precision. However, the fran-
chisee should be required to fulfill current obligations under the fran-
chise, including the payment of royalties and the maintenance of
quality standards.' 99
3. Unfair Franchise Practices and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act
The impact of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act on
franchise sales practice abuses has already been discussed. 200 Section
5's prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce"2 01 could also provide the foundation for movement by the
FTC into other areas of unfair practices by franchisors, such as arbi-
trary terminations and reacquisitions of franchises without adequate
compensation. 202
The Supreme Court has emphasized that section 5 goes "beyond
antitrust" and can cover acts and practices not in violation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. In Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC20 3 for
199. Cf. Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941 (9th
Cir. 1972) (franchisees suing for damages and restitution enjoined pendente lite on fran-
chisor's counterclaim for breach of contract from using franchisor's trademark since
franchisees refused to pay fees or respect quality control procedures).
200. See notes 85-109 and accompanying text supra.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
202. See generally Kamenshine, Competition Versus Fairness in Franchising, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 204-13 (1971).
203. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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example, the Court upheld the application by the FTC of section 5 to
an arrangement between Atlantic Refining and Goodyear Tire under
which Atlantic Refining induced its dealers to purchase Goodyear
tires, batteries, and accessories from Goodyear, and Goodyear paid a
ten percent commission on such sales to Atlantic Refining. The Court
noted that the commission plan was not a tying arrangement in the
antitrust sense since Atlantic Refining dealers were not expressly re-
quired to purchase tires, batteries and accessories. Nevertheless, it had
a similar effect since Atlantic exerted not only its natural economic
power over dealers but also used direct and overt threats of reprisal
against dealers not purchasing Goodyear products. The Court also
held that the FTC could prohibit the commission plan itself, if inher-
ently coercive, and not just the acts of coercion on dealers. In FTC v.
Texaco, Inc.,20 4 the Court upheld FTC action against a similar com-
mission plan between Texaco and B. F. Goodrich even though there
was no evidence of acts of direct coercion or threats of reprisal. The
court stressed the subtle power that Texaco had over its dealers whose
franchises were subject to termination on short notice. Lower court
decisions since Atlantic Refining and Texaco have held that the com-
mission plan, though a violation of section 5, is not a violation of the
Sherman Act and hence cannot support a private action for treble
damages.205
More recently, the Supreme Court has upheld the FTC's authority
to prohibit under section 5 as "unfair," acts and practices that do not
even resemble antitrust violations.206 In a case involving FTC action
against a trading stamp company's efforts to stop "trafficking" in its
stamps, the Court remanded to the FTC for additional findings, de-
scribing the "reach" of section 5 in expansive terms by stating that the
FTC may consider "public values beyond simply those enshrined in
the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws. '2 07 The
Court cited with apparent approval a FTC statement that in assessing
the fairness of a practice it considers such factors as whether the prac-
tice is within the "penumbra of some common-law, statutory or other
established concept of unfairness," whether it is "immoral, unethical,
204. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
205. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972); Lee Nat'1 Corp. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 308 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
206. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
207. 405 U.S. at 244.
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oppressive or unscrupulous," and whether it "causes substantial injury
to consumers .... "208
Thus, section 5 seems to provide ample authority for the FTC to
define and prohibit certain franchisor practices as "unfair" to franchi-
sees. There is evidence that the FTC has in fact informally acted to
protect franchisees from unfair practices. 209 However, FTC enforce-
ment through section 5 of standards of fairness in franchising is sub-
ject to the same remedial problems-the apparent absence of
rule-making authority and private remedies-that are discussed above
in connection with sales practice abuses. 210
III. THE WASHINGTON ACT
The impetus for enactment of franchise legislation in Washington
began in the Consumer Protection Division of the Washington State
Attorney General's Office. 211 The Division had accumulated a number
of complaints about franchisor sales and competitive practices. After
investigating these complaints and reviewing the conclusions reached
208. Id. at 244 n.5.
209. FTC protection of dealers has been criticized on the ground that it may
preserve inefficient dealers and franchisees and thus harm competition:
The efforts of the Commission to protect small dealers from allegedly unfair and
coercive business practices constitutes a dark chapter in the Commission's history.
Much of this enforcement activity does not eventuate in formal proceedings. What
happens is that a dealer who is terminated, for whatever reason, is likely to com-
plain to the Commission, knowing that the relevant Commission staff is well dis-
posed toward "small business." The staff uses the threat of an FTC proceeding to
get the supplier to reinstate the dealer, and if threats fail--usually they succeed-
the FTC may file a complaint charging the supplier with having cut off the dealer,
because he was a price cutter, or for some other nefarious reason. Our impression.
in sum, is that the Commission, especially at the informal level, has evolved an
effective law of dealer protection that is unrelated and often contrary to the objec-
tives of the antitrust laws. The Commission is supported in this endeavor by the
Supreme Court's rulings that Section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the Commission
to suppress practices that resemble antitrust violations.
REPORT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (1969),
reprinted in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 413, at X-3 (June 10, 1969).
In a recent proposed complaint, the FTC announced that it was considering requiring
gasoline companies to alter their dealer station leases so that (I) they would be subject
to cancellation only for good cause, and (2) the question of good cause would have to be
submitted to arbitration. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 7, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
210. See notes 85-109 and accompanying text supra.
21 1. For a detailed description of the legislative history of the Act, see J. Fletcher,
Franchise Investment Protection Act, June 1971 (unpublished thesis in University of
Washington Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher]. Mr. Fletcher was a
draftsman of the Act while working as a legal intern for the Washington Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. His thesis contains the successive drafts of the various bills proposed with
comments thereon.
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by the Federal Trade Commission, the New York State Attorney
General's Office, and agencies of other states which had investigated
franchising, the Division concluded that protective legislation was
needed.212 A franchise bill was drafted, combining the registration
and disclosure provisions of the California Franchise Investment
Law21 3 and the "fair practice" provisions of a bill introduced in the
Massachusetts legislature.21 4
The final draft of the bill was introduced into both houses of the
Washington legislature on February 19, 1971, as House Bill 938 and
Senate Bill 755. 215 The House Bill died in the Business and Profes-
sional Committee. 21 6 The Senate Bill was reported out of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, however, and passed the Senate with a few
amendments to the definition of "franchise" and the "fair practices"
section. 21 7
Subsequently, Senate Bill 755 was reported out of the House Rules
Committee.218 On the floor of the House, franchisor interests ex-
pressed stiff opposition to the bill.21 9 The result was more amend-
ments, including the "Hertz-Avis" exemption220 and a provision de-
laying the effective date of the Act from January 1, 1972 to.May 1,
1972 in order to give the franchise interests another opportunity to
amend the Act during the 1972 Session of the legislature.221 As
amended, the bill passed both the House and the Senate and was
signed by Governor Evans.
A vigorous legislative battle over the Act was anticipated in the
1972 Session of the legislature with franchisor interest groups, in-
cluding the International Franchise Association, expected to press for
diluting amendments. William Clarke, Chief of the Consumer Protec-
212. Id. at 11.
213. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West Supp. 1972).
214. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Fair Dealing In Franchising Act, H. 2279
(1970), reproduced in Report on the Impact of Franchising, supra note 1, Appendix
M at 131.
215. Fletcher, at 44.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 46-52.
218. Id. at 52.
219. Id.
220. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.030(5) (Supp. 1972). This provision exempts those
"engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles through an interdependent
system of direct and franchised operations in interstate commerce in twenty or more
states." See text accompanying note 307 infra.
221. Fletcher, at 52-57.
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tion Division, vowed to defend staunchly the Act and the public in-
terest it sought to protect.222 In fact, the conflict was settled behind
closed doors. Mr. Clarke and Attorney General Slade Gorton met
with representatives of the franchise industry and reached agreement
on a set of amendments which in several respects diluted the protec-
tion offered to franchisees by the Act.223 The amendments were
hastily attached to a "title-only" bill2 24 and approved 225 without sig-
nificant public participation.
The remainder of this Article will discuss the provisions of the
Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act relating to coverage,
administrative procedures, disclosure requirements, fair practice stan-
dards, and remedies for violations.
A. Coverage
1. Interstate Transactions-Choice of Law
Franchises are generally sold on a regional or national basis. Con-
sequently, questions inevitably will arise as to the territorial coverage
of the Act.2 2 6 Since franchisors generally advertise the availability of
franchises in nationally circulated media, a franchisor may sell a fran-
chise located in Washington to a resident of another state who may or
may not change his residence to Washington. Conversely, a franchisor
may sell a franchise located in another state to a Washington resident.
Finally, franchisors may seek to have franchise agreements with
222. Wong, In Absence of Federal Rules, More States Begin Regulating the Fran-
chise Industry, Wall Street Journal, Oct. I1, 1971, at 22, col. 1-3.
223. Weakening amendments added in 1972 include several exemptions from regis-
tration, see text accompanying notes 302-05 infra; a provision apparently restricting the
contents of the franchise offering circular, see text accompanying note 361 infra; a pro-
vision restricting disclosures on prior franchise failures, see text accompanying note 379
infra; a provision allowing earnings projections in franchise sales, see text accompa-
nying note 385 infra; a provision diluting the prior prohibition of "kick-backs," see text
accompanying note 423 infra; and a provision authorizing awards of attorneys' fees
against suing franchisees, see text accompanying note 482 infra. On the other hand,
some amendments were constructive, such as the provision on termination, see text
accompanying note 451 infra; and the ban on chain distributorships, see text accom-
panying note 458 infra.
224. E.S.H.B. No. 417, 42d Wash. Legis., 2d Ex. Sess. (1972). A "title-only" bill is
one introduced without text to meet time limits on the filing of bills. Such bills also have
the effect of preventing public discussion of proposed legislation.
225. Ch. 116 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
226. For a general discussion of the similar problem of the territorial coverage of
state securities laws, see Loss, The Conflict of Laws and ihe Blue Sky Laws, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 209 (1957).
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Washington residents actually executed in a different state in order to
avoid the provisions of the Act.
To determine the territorial coverage of the Act, the pertinent lan-
guage of its provisions must be examined. Section 2 makes it unlawful
"to sell or offer to sell any franchise in this state" unless the offer has
been registered. 227 "Offer to sell" is defined broadly to include "every
attempt or offer to dispose of or solicitation of an offer to buy a fran-
chise or an interest in a franchise. '228 Section 8 directs that "[a] ny
person offering for sale or selling within this state, whether or not one
or more franchises will be located within this state must present
[certain information] to prospective franchisees forty-eight hours prior
to the sale. '229 Section 10 provides that "[n] o person shall publish
in this state any advertisements offering a franchise subject to the
registration requirements of this law unless a true copy of the ad-
vertisement, has been filed..." seven days in advance with the
administrator of the Act.2 3 0 Section 11 provides that "[n] o person
shall publish in this state any advertisements concerning a franchise
subject to the registration requirements... " if the administrator has
found the advertisement to be false or misleading. 231 The terms "ad-
vertisement '232 and "publish"233 are defined broadly in the Act.
The California Franchise Investment Law contains an adequate
definition of the key phrase "in this state" which carefully spells out
the territorial coverage of the law as to advertising, soliciting and
selling franchises in California. 23 4 Unfortunately, a comparable defi-
227. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.020 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
228. Id. § 19.100.010(15).
229. Id. § 19.100.080 (emphasis added).
230. Id. § 19.100.100 (emphasis added).
231. Id. § 19.100.110 (emphasis added).
232. "'Advertisement' means any written or printed communication or any com-
munication by means of recorded telephone messages or spoken on radio, television, or
similar communication media published in connection with an offer or sale of a fran-
chise." Id. § 19.100.010(l).
233. "'Publish' means publicly to issue or circulate by newspaper, mail, radio, or
television or otherwise to disseminate to the public." Id. § 19.100.010(13).
234. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31013 (West Supp. 1972):
(a) An offer or sale of a franchise is made in this state when an offer to sell is
made in this state, or an offer to buy is accepted in this state, or, if the franchisee is
domiciled in this state, the franchised business is or will be operated in this state.
(b) An offer to sell is made in this state when the offer either originates from this
state or is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place to which it is
directed. An offer to sell is accepted in this state when acceptance is communicated
to the offeror in this state; and acceptance is communicated to the offeror in this
state when the offeree directs it to the offeror in this state reasonably believing the
offeror to be in this state and it is received at the place to which it is directed.
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nition was omitted from the Washington Act in favor of the more
ambiguous provision in section 16:235
Any person who is engaged or hereafter engages directly or indirectly
in the sale or offer to sell a franchise or in business dealings con-
cerning a franchise, either in person or in any other form of com-
munication, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter, shall be
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state and shall be
amenable to the service of process under RCW 4.28.180, 4.28.185
and 19.86.160.
R.C.W. §§ 4.28.180 and 4.28.185 are the Washington "long-arm"
statutes which establish Washington jurisdiction over persons in other
states for causes of action arising out of business or tortious conduct
done within the state. R.C.W. § 19.86.160236 is the long-arm statute
of the Consumer Protection Act which allows out-of-state service of
process on persons who have "engaged in conduct in violation of [the
Consumer Protection Act] which has had the impact in this state
which this [Act] reprehends." However inartful the draftsmanship, in
most situations the legislative intent of section 16 is reasonably clear.
The impact of the long-arm statutes incorporated by the Act upon
sales and solicitation, advertising, and fair practices will be considered
separately.
(a) Sales and Solicitation. Section 16, the "impact" language of
the Consumer Protection Act and the broad definition of "offer to
sell" 23 7 indicate that a "minimum contacts" approach should be taken
in regard to the registration and disclosure provisions (sections 2
and 8) of the Act. Thus, if a Washington resident is solicited in per-
son, by telephone, or through the mail to invest in a franchise, the
offer must have been previously registered in Washington (unless ex-
empted by the Act) regardless of the location of the franchise, the sub-
(c) An offer to sell is not made in this state merely because (1) the publisher cir-
culates or there is circulated on his behalf in this state any bona fide newspaper or
other publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which has had more than
two-thirds of its circulation outside this state during the past 12 months, or (2) a
radio or television program originating outside this state is received in this state.
235. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.160 (Supp. 1972).
236. "Personal service of any process in an action under this chapter may be made
upon any person outside the state if such person has engaged in conduct in violation of
this chapter which has had the impact in this state which this chapter reprehends." WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.160 (Supp. 1972).
237. See note 228 and accompanying text supra.
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sequent negotiations or the actual signing of a franchise agreement.238
A closer question is whether the registration and disclosure provi-
sions of the Act should apply whenever the franchise is to be located
in Washington. The California law would apply to franchises located
in the state only if the franchisee is domiciled in the state or the offer
to sell or buy is made in the state.23 9 It can be argued that the Wash-
ington Act did not intend to offer protection to residents of other
states who make franchise investments in Washington. On the other
hand, such a construction might encourage franchisors to sell all their
Washington franchises to residents of other states, thereby depriving
Washington residents of advantageous business opportunities. 240 On
balance, however, the approach of the California law should be
followed.
(b) Advertising. The Act requires franchise advertisements to be
filed with the administrator of the Act seven days prior to publication
(section 10)241 and prohibits the publication of advertisements which
the administrator has found to be misleading (section 11).242 In the
original draft of the bill, section 10 (prefiling) was applicable only to
persons who "publish in this state any advertisement concerning a
franchise subject to the registration requirements" of the Franchise
Act while section 11 (administrative control) was applicable to all per-
sons who "publish in this state any advertisement concerning a fran-
chise."243 The purpose of these sections apparently was to give the
administrator control over all misleading franchise advertising dissem-
238. The constitutionality, under the commerce clause and due process clause of the
United States Constitution, of applying the Washington Act broadly to all solicitations
of Washington residents wherever their origin seems assured. See Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Merrick v.
N.W. Halsey and Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); see also Loss, supra note 226, at 226-27.
239. "An offer or sale of a franchise is made in this state when ... if the franchisee is
domiciled in this state, the franchised business is or will be operated in this state." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31013(a) (West Supp. 1972).
240. It should be noted that Washington has expressed an interest in avoiding the
adverse "impact" on Washington residents which results from the unscrupulous business
dealings of any nonresidents. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.160 (Supp. 1972). The resulting
"impact" arguably could come indirectly from the injury to the nonresident franchisee
operating in Washington.
241. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.100 (Supp. 1972), discussed at notes 346-52 and
accompanying text infra.
242. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.110 (Supp. 1972), discussed at notes 346-52 and
accompanying text infra.
243. See Fletcher, supra note 211, at Appendix H. The provisions were copied from
the California Franchise Investment Law. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31156-57 (West Supp.
1972).
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inated in the state-even if the franchisor was exempt or otherwise
not subject to the registration requirement. When the original bill
reached the floor of the Senate, concern was expressed that section 11
might impose an "unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce
with respect to those advertisements published in national magazines
and merely distributed in Washington. '244 Consequently, section 11
was amended so as to apply only to advertisements "subject to the reg-
istration requirement."
The constitutional problem alluded to is probably not substan-
tial. 245 In any event, the amendment is inept considering its purpose.
First, it goes beyond its purpose by freeing from any administrative
control advertising of franchises offered in Washington but exempt
from registration. Second, it did not really accomplish its purpose.
The issue is complex due to the draftsmen's failure to recognize that
virtually any "advertisement" also constitutes an "offer to sell" a fran-
chise within the meaning of the Act.246 An advertisement is an "offer
to sell" a franchise which can be made in the state only if it is regis-
tered or exempt from registration. 247 Hence an advertisement in a na-
tionally circulated newspaper or magazine often would be subject to
the registration requirement of the Act as an "offer to sell" and a for-
tiori not removed from sections 10 and 11.
The proper path around this labyrinth would have been to leave
sections 10 and 11 as they were in the original draft but to limit care-
fully the scope of "offer to sell" so as to exclude advertisements in na-
244. Fletcher, supra note 211, at 49.
245. Cf. note 238 supra.
246. Franchise advertisements are "offers" under the Act. Compare WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.100.010(1) (Supp. 1972) with § 19.100.010(15). This seems clear from the
comparable treatment of advertisements under the state and federal securities acts. "Of-
fer" is defined in the securities statutes in a fashion virtually identical to the Washington
Franchise Investment Protection Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.005(10) (Supp. 1972). An advertisement indicating availability ofa security
has long been considered an "offer." See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8,
1957). All advertising of securities is severely confined under federal law by the require-
ment that written offers be made only in a complete statutory prospectus. It is generally
not feasible to place all the information required to be in a prospectus in an advertise-
ment. The only advertising allowed under federal law is the so-called "tombstone ad"
which merely identifies the security and where to obtain a prospectus. SEC Rule 134, 17
C.F.R. § 230.134 (1972). Washington law is more liberal than federal law in that written
offers of securities can be made after registration by means of public advertisements so
long as a buyer receives a prospectus before the sale is consummated. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.230 (Supp. 1972). This same liberality toward advertisements is followed in the
Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act.
247. See note 246 supra.
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tionally circulated newspapers and magazines. This was done in the
California Franchise Investment Law.248 The failure of the draftsmen
of the Washington Act to follow suit is inexcusable. A similar result
perhaps can be achieved through a salvaging construction of "offer to
sell. ' 249 As a precaution, franchisors not registered in Washington
should include in their advertisements disclaimers voiding the offer to
Washington residents as is the common practice with securities adver-
tisements.2 50
Only advertisements in a national publication should be exempt
from the Act's registration provisions. If a Washington resident re-
sponds to such an advertisement, no reply by the franchisor should be
permitted unless the franchisor has complied with the Act.251
(c) Fair Practices Provisions. Section 18 of the Act attempts to
regulate the continuing relationship between the franchisor and fran-
chisee, imposing both specific and general requirements that the parties
deal with each other in good faith.252 The Act does not indicate the
territorial coverage of section 18. It would seem, however, that the
state where the franchise is actually located usually has the greatest
interest in a transaction which creates a continuing relationship be-
tween a franchisor and a franchisee. 253 This would be especially true
if the state where the franchise is located is also the franchisee's cur-
rent domicile. Since the law of the situs state generally applies to ques-
tions of performance of the franchise agreement, 254 section 18 should
be construed as applying to all franchises located in Washington, re-
248. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31013(c) (West Supp. 1972):
An offer to sell is not made in this state merely because (1) the publisher circulates
or there is circulated on his behalf in this state any bona fide newspaper or other
publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which has had more than
two-thirds of its circulation outside this state during the past 12 months, or (2) a
radio or television program originating outside this state is received in this state.
249. "Offer to sell" should not, however, be narrowed so as to exclude all advertise-
ments. Franchisors should be prohibited from publishing advertisements in local media
or utilizing direct mail advertising unless they have complied with the Act's registration
requirement.
250. It is not clear whether such a self-serving legend is in fact effective to prevent
an advertisement from being an "offer." See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 242-43
(2d ed. 1961).
251. Such a reply would be an "attempt to dispose of a franchise" and thus an "offer
to sell." WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(15) (Supp. 1972).
252. Id. § 19.100.180(1).
253. The Washington courts follow the "center of gravity" or "most significant rela-
tionship "approach to the contract choice of law problem. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monti-
cello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623-(1967).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 196 (1971).
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gardless of where the franchise agreement was negotiated and exe-
cuted.
If a clause in a franchise agreement attempts to apply the law of
another jurisdiction in a situation in which the Washington Act would
otherwise apply, the clause should be invalid under section 22 of the
Act which voids any "provision purporting to bind any person ac-
quiring a franchise at the time of entering into a franchise ... agree-
ment to waive compliance with any provision" of the Act.255
2. Definition of a "Franchise"
Adequately defining the term "franchise" is one of the most difficult
tasks in drafting franchise legislation. 256 Attempted definitions tend to
be both over- and under-inclusive in terms of solving the problems
and abuses which have been the impetus for franchise legislation. The
primary legislative concern has been with "franchises" sold on a broad
scale as prepackaged businesses with goodwill already generated by
the franchisor to persons of relatively modest means and limited so-
phistication. The typical promotion of these franchises offers employ-
ment and entrepreneurial opportunities to persons without general or
specific business experience.
The Washington Act defines a franchise as an "agreement... in
which a person grants to another person, a license to use a trade
name, service mark, trade mark, logotype or related characteristic
in which there is a community interest in the business of offering...
goods or services . . .and in which the franchisee is required to
pay . . . a franchise fee .... ,,257 "Franchise fee" is then defined in an
elaborate fashion to include generally any capital investment fee,
royalty-type payment, payment for the mandatory purchase of goods
or services, training or training school fee or other payment. Excluded
from the definition of "franchise fees" are amounts realized from
purchases or leases of property at a fair market or rental value
and from bona fide wholesale transactions. 258 The Washington defini-
255. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.220 (Supp. 1972).
256. See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 3-4 (1969); D.
THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 7-17.
257. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(4) (Supp. 1972).
258. Id. § 19.100.010(11). It is important to note that a required payment for ser-
vices, even at reasonable value, is not excluded. Thus the typical charge to franchisees
for advertising of the franchise system would constitute a "franchise fee."
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tion is similar but not identical to the definitions in the California
Franchise Investment Law259 and the proposed Federal Trade Com-
mission Rule.2 60
Given the concern of the legislature with franchise sales practice
abuses and other unfair practices by franchisors, the definition of
"franchise" in the Washington Act is under-inclusive in two respects.
First, there is no justification for requiring that the agreement include
a license to use a trademark or "related characteristic." It is true that
most franchises sold involve such a license. But a person might be
induced to make a substantial investment in a prepackaged business to
be conducted in his own name as an outlet for the franchisor's goods
or services. Simply selling goods which bear the franchisor's trade-
mark does not constitute a licensed "use" of the trademark. 261 In this
respect, the FTC's definition seems preferable as it requires only that
there be a "continuing commercial relationship.., under circum-
stances where the franchisor continues to exert any control over the
method of operation of the franchisee," with control through a trade-
mark license being just one example of such control.262
Second, there does not seem to be adequate justification for re-
quiring that there be a "franchise fee" as defined in the Act. It is true
that "franchise fee" is defined broadly to include franchisors who
might attempt to extract a hidden fee in the form of overcharges for
property sold to the franchisee. But the risk that a relatively unsophis-
ticated person will make a substantial investment in a prepackaged
259. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31005 (West Supp. 1972):
"Franchise" means a contract.., between two or more persons by which: (a) a
franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering... goods or ser-
vices under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a fran-
chisor; and (b) the operation of the franchisee's business is substantially associated
with the franchisor's trademark ... or other commercial symbol designating the
franchisor... ; and (c) the franchisee is required to pay... a franchise fee.
260. Federal Trade Commission, Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Involving Dis-
closure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, Definitions, 5 TRADE
REG. REP. 50,310 (Nov. 10, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Proposed FTC Rule]:
"Franchise" means every aspect of the relationship between a franchisor and a fran-
chisee by an... agreement.., which involve [s] ... a continuing commercial rela-
tionship by which a franchisee is . . . permitted to offer . . . the goods . . .
manufactured, processed, or distributed by the franchisor, or the right to
offer.., services established, organized, directed, or approved by the franchisor,
under circumstances where the franchisor continues to exert any control over the
method of operation of the franchisee, particularly, but not exclusively, through
trademark, trade name, or service mark licensing, or structural or physical layout
of the franchisee's business.
261. See note 6 supra.
262. See note 260 supra.
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franchise business (including real property, fixtures and inventory)
without adequate information exists whether or not a franchise fee as
defined in the Act is charged. The original draft of the Washington
Act did not include any requirement that there be a franchise fee. The
requirement was added on the floor of the Senate in response to
lobbying pressure by business groups such as the Washington Business
Association. 263 Apparently, the reason for the pressure was the con-
cern of firms such as Sears, Penney's and Montgomery Ward that
some of their branch stores would be covered under the original defi-
nition of a franchise. 264 Again, the FTC's definition seems preferable,
as it does not require payment of a franchise fee.265
On the other hand, the definition of a "franchise" in the Wash-
ington Act seems over-inclusive in at least one respect: it is not con-
fined to prepackaged and standardized businesses.2 66 Consider, for
example, an organization that sells cleaning solvent to local dry
cleaners and prescribes and enforces quality service standards. In re-
turn, a local subscribing dry cleaner is granted the right to display a
regionally or nationally advertised symbol of quality. 267 If a fee is
charged for the quality control, or the advertising, the arrangement
would seem to constitute a "franchise" within the meaning of the
Washington Act. Yet such an arrangement is not the sort of standard-
ized, prepackaged franchise sold to persons not previously in the trade
that concerned the Washington legislature. In this respect, the Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law's definition seems preferable. It re-
quires that the agreement grant "the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling or distributing goods or services under a marketing
plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor." 268
263. See Fletcher, supra note 211, at 45-49.
264. Id.
265. See note 260 supra. The effect of the narrow definition of a franchise in al-
lowing easy evasion of the Franchise Act's protective provisions was publicized in a
recent article on a couple who lost over $9000 on "distributorships." They were not pro-
tected by the Act since the distributorships involved no "franchise fee"--merely large
investments in inventory. Schwartz, The Sad Story of 'Mr. and Mrs. Gullible,' Seattle
Times, Nov. 19, 1972, at A- 16, col. 1-8.
266. The Proposed FTC Rule suffers from the same kind of over-inclusiveness in
that it covers continuing commercial relationships where the franchisor "continues to
exert any control over the method of operation of the franchisee." See note 260 supra
(emphasis added).
267. Such a symbol of quality may be federally registered under the Lanham Act as
a "certification mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (1970).
268. See note 259 supra (emphasis added).
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3. Exemptions
The Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act contains sev-
eral exemptions. First, the general definition of "franchise" exempts a
number of specific relationships, 269 thereby removing them entirely
from the provisions of the Act. Second, various types of franchise
transactions are unconditionally exempt from the registration require-
ments of sections 2 and 4,270 while other specified transactions are
exempt from the registration requirement only if the franchisor dis-
closes information to the franchisee similar to that which would be
required in the registration.27' Finally, the Act exempts one special
type of franchise from both the registration and fair practices sec-
tions,2 72 leaving such franchises subject only to the antifraud section
of the Act.
(a) Exempt Relationships. The Act excludes three types of rela-
tionships from the definition of a "franchise.1273 The first exclusion is
for "the payment of a reasonable service charge to the issuer of a
credit card by an establishment accepting or honoring such credit
card or any transaction relating to a bank credit card plan.127 4 This
exclusion is seemingly necessitated by the over-inclusiveness of the defi-
nition of a "franchise." 275 Credit card agreements between issuing
companies and merchants do involve a continuing commercial re-
lationship, a license to use a symbol, and a "franchise fee." However,
while there are some problems with these agreements, they are not of
the same dimension as those connected with the typical prepackaged
franchise business that concerned the Washington legislature.276 The
269. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(4)(c) (Supp. 1972).
270. Id. § 19.100.030(l)-(3).
271. Id.§ 19.100.030(4).
272. Id. § 19.100.030(5).
273. See note 269 supra. These exclusions appear to be the obvious result of the
powerful lobbying efforts of banks, insurance companies, and automobile manufac-
turers.
.274. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(4)(a) (Supp. 1972); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §
31103 (West Supp. 1972). "Bank credit card plan" is defined in WASH. REV. CODE §
19.100.010(5) (Supp. 1972). This exclusion was added as part of the 1972 amendment
package.
275. See note 266 and accompanying text supra.
276. Agreements between merchants and credit card issuers usually include restric-
tive clauses which preclude retailers from offering merchandise at reduced prices to per-
sons willing to pay cash rather than use a credit card. There is also evidence of pressure
by banks on retailers to maintain an account with the bank issuing the card. See Com-
ment, Price Fixing and Tying Arrangements Between Credit Card Issuers and Retailers,
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first half of the exclusion is really an exception to the definition of a
"franchise fee," but questions may arise as to what is a "reasonable
service charge." Presumably, the typical "discount" which credit card
companies such as Carte Blanche, American Express, and Diner's
Club deduct from the sales volume charged on their cards will be
viewed as a reasonable service charge. The second half of the exclu-
sion is broader in scope. The intent is to exclude not only agreements
between local banks and merchants but also agreements between local
banks and the national interchange system for cards such as Bank-
Americard and Master Charge. 277
The second exclusion from the definition of a "franchise" covers
"actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited or regulated
under laws administered by the insurance commissioner of this
state."278 The apparent intent is to exempt from regulation under the
Act relationships between insurance companies and their agents and
brokers. The exemption cannot be justified by asserting that regulation
equivalent to that provided by the Franchise Act is imposed by the
insurance commissioner. Although the state insurance laws regulate
the business of insurance generally and provide for the licensing of
insurance agents and brokers,279 the purpose of such regulation is to
protect the public and not to control either the procurement of agents
and brokers by insurance companies or the continuing relationship
between the parties.28 0 The exemption may be justified, however, on
the ground that these types of relationships have not been shown to
involve the kinds of problems that led to the enactment of the Fran-
chise Act. Further, the public interest in insurance practices may dic-
tate that no additional protection against termination be afforded to
brokers and agents beyond that afforded by the common law. 28 '
28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 371 (1971). Such agreements do not, however, involve the
kind of pervasive control over the merchant's business as is involved with the typical
franchise.
277. For general discussions of bank charge cards, see Brandel & Leonard, Bank
Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit?, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1033 (197 1); Webster, Bank
Charge Cards--Recent Developments in Regulation and Operation, 26 Bus. Law.
43(1970).
278. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.010(4)(b) (Supp. 1972). This exclusion was
added as part of the 1972 amendment package.
279. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.17.010-.580 (1959).
280. See 16A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8951 (rev. ed. 1968).
281. The danger to the consuming public of granting any kind of tenure to an insur-
ance agent who may be incompetent or unscrupulous may outweigh any legitimate
interests of the agent in fair treatment to an extent not present in other industries.
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The final exclusion from the definition of a "franchise" covers "any
motor vehicle dealer franchise subject to the provisions of chapter
46.70 RCW.' '2 82 This exclusion was apparently predicated on the as-
sumption that adequate regulation of motor vehicle franchising al-
ready exists under Washington's "baby" Automobile Dealers Act.283
However, the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, unlike the Franchise Act,
does not address itself to problems with the sale of franchises to local
dealers. Nevertheless, while sales practice abuses in this area are not
unknown,2 84 they do not appear to have been a persistent problem.
Therefore, exclusion of motor vehicle dealerships from the Franchise
Act is probably justifiable.
(b) Unconditionally Exempt Transactions. The Washington Fran-
chise Investment Protection Act exempts three types of transactions
from its registration requirement: (1) isolated franchise sales by a
franchisee;2 85 (2) transactions by executors, sheriffs, receivers, and the
like;28 6 and (3) sales to financial institutions or to broker dealers
where the purchaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity.287
These exemptions are substantially identical to the exemptions con-
Furthermore, an insurance agent is a catalyst for direct dealing between his clients
and insurance companies. This is not the case with franchises in other industries.
282. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(4)(c) (Supp. 1972). In the 1971 Act the exemp-
tion for motor vehicle dealers was contained in section 3 of the Act and was an exemp-
tion from the registration provisions of the Act only. The 1972 amendment package
made it an excluded relationship, thereby lifting it out of the Franchise Act entirely.
Compare ch. 116. § 1(4)(c) [ 1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. with ch. 252, § 3(5) [1971]
Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
283. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.70.180(7), (8), .190-.210 (1969). For a discussion of
the Federal Automobile Dealers Act, see text accompanying note 148 supra. Although
Washington's Act is basically similar to the Federal Automobile Dealers Act, it does
differ in several specific respects. First, it applies to all "motor vehicle" dealers (defining
"motor vehicle" as every device which is self-propelled and capable of being moved
upon a public highway (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.04.320, .670 (1959)) and not solely to
automobile dealers. Second, it is more specific in defining impermissible practices,
listing for example, coercion against dealers to order vehicles or parts that they do not
desire. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.180(7)(a) (1969). Third, it provides almost automatic
ad litem relief to the dealer from cancellation by the manufacturer. WASH. REV. CODE §
46.70.210 (1969). Finally, it seems to allow free cancellation by the manufacturer not in
good faith so long as the dealer is compensated "at a fair going business value for his
capital investment." WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.180(7)(b) (1969). There are no reported
appellate opinions interpreting the Washington Motor Vehicle Dealers Act of 1967.
284. One of the most famous episodes was the Tucker car promotion in 1946-47.
Tucker raised over $4,000,000 by selling franchises to prospective distributors and
dealers. See In re Tucker Corporation, 26 S.E.C. 249, 252-53 (1947). The streets of
America, of course, were never blessed with the Tucker car.
285. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.030(1) (Supp. 1972).
286. Id. § 19.100.030(2).
287. Id. § 19.100.030(3).
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tained in the Washington Securities Act.288 The first is justified by the
franchisee's interest in being able to liquidate his franchise investment
without incurring the burden of registration.289 The exemption is over-
broad, however. If the franchisor is already registered to sell franchises
in the state, the franchisor should be required to supply informa-
tion to the franchisee's transferee and should be subject to the re-
medial provisions of the Act just as if the franchisor sold directly to
the transferee. In addition, the exemption should be limited to trans-
actions "wholly free of any involvement by the franchisor."29 0 If the
franchisor participates in the transfer, it is appropriate to require the
franchisor to register and supply the required disclosures to the fran-
chisee's transferee.
The second exemption for transactions by executors, sheriffs, re-
ceivers and the like is of questionable wisdom insofar as it may allow
sales of franchises beyond those exempted under the "isolated sale"
exemption. The third exemption for sales to financial institutions and
broker dealers is justified by the high level of buyer sophistication and
the correspondingly low need for the protection which registration
provides.
(c) Conditional Exemptions. The Act provides three conditional
registration exemptions for franchisors whose offerings meet pre-
scribed requirements. 291 All three exemptions are conditioned upon
(1) the franchisor's providing timely information to the prospective
franchisee similar to that required in a registration statement filed with
288. Id. § 21.20.320(1), (6), (8).
289. The "isolated sale" exemption in state securities acts has been narrowly con-
strued. See I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 61 (2d ed. 1961). A franchisee holding
more than one franchise probably is not freed by the exemption to dispose of them
without registration. There is some question whether this Securities Act exemption
is superfluous when incorporated into the Franchise Act. The registration require-
ment of the Franchise Act only applies to "any franchisor or subfranchisor" who
offers or sells franchises in the state. Id. § 19.100.020 (emphasis added); cf. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 31110 (West Supp. 1972) ("unlawful for any person to offer or sell any
franchise ....") (emphasis added). A franchisee in selling his franchise would appear not
to be within the definition of either a "franchisor" (one "who grants a franchise," WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.100.010(7) (Supp. 1972)) or a "subfranchisor" (one who is granted the
right to sell franchises on behalf of the franchisor, id. § 19.100.010(8), (9)). However, the
insertion of the exemption would indicate that the legislature must have intended a
broader interpretation of the registration requirement than the language of the statute
otherwise might indicate. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.100.080, .140 (Supp. 1972).
290. Proposed FTC Rule, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,310 (Nov. 10, 1971); Cf. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31102 (West Supp. 1972) ("sale of a franchise by a franchisee for his own
account.., if the sale is not effected by or through a franchisor").
291. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.030(4)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1972).
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the director 292 and identical to that which must be provided to pro-
spective franchisees in a registered offering,293 and (2) the franchisor's
not having been found by a court to have violated the Franchise Act,
the State Consumer Protection Act or "any of the various federal stat-
utes dealing with the same or similar matters" in the last seven years.2 94
The effect of the conditional registration exemptions is threefold.
First, the franchisor need not pay the registration fee.295 Second, the
franchisor need not provide any additional information required by
the statute or the director 2 96 Finally, the franchisor is not subject to
certain administrative powers of the director, including the power to
require an escrow of franchise fees297 and the power to issue a stop
order halting the sale of franchises on various grounds. 298 Since the
burdens alleviated by these conditional exemptions do not appear to
be excessive for the legitimate franchisor, all the conditional exemp-
tions are of questionable wisdom.
The first conditional exemption is for franchise offerings which
meet three additional tests: (1) the franchisor or its parent corporation
has a net worth of more than $5 million; (2) the franchisor or its
parent corporation has operated the business for at least five years ei-
ther directly or through 25 or more franchises; and (3) the franchisor
requires an initial investment in excess of $100,000.299 A franchisor
292. Id. § 19.100.030(4)(a). The registration statement specifically includes three
items which are not required to be disclosed by the conditional exemption: (1) in-
formation on the identity and business experience of persons affiliated with the fran-
chisor which the director may require by rule, id. § 19.100.040(4); (2) a statement
whether any person identified in the registration statement has been found guilty of
specified kinds of misconduct, id. § 19.100.040(5); and (3) financial statements of the
franchisor, id. § 19.100.040(7). The director also is given discretion to require informa-
tion in the registration statement in addition to that specified in the statute, id. §
19.100.040(20), but no similar power is given the director to expand the disclosure re-
quired under the conditional exemption. See notes 360-69 and accompanying text infra.
293. The Act expressly requires disclosure to prospective franchisees of the mate-
rials specified in WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.030(4)(a) (Supp. 1972). Id. § 19.100.080.
294. Id. § 19.100.030(4)(c). The second condition is intended to limit the exemp-
tions to "good guys" with clean records, but it is both ambiguous and incomplete. It
omits violations of similar laws in other states and violations found by administrative
agencies rather than courts. It is unclear what is included within the "various federal
statutes," although the Federal Trade Commission Act is clearly one of them. The ex-
emption obviously was hastily drafted. A better "good guy" test is the more carefully con-
structed "prior record" statement required in registration statements under the Act. Id.
§ 19.100.040(5).
295. Id. § 19.100.240.
296. See note 292 supra.
297. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.050 (Supp. 1972).
298. Id. § 19.100.120. See notes 320-24 and accompanying text infra.
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.130(4)(b)(i) (Supp. 1972). The Act does not
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claiming this particular exemption must file a statement giving notice
of such claim with the director. 30 0 The exemption appears to be a
narrow one; in a 1970 publication by the United States Department of
Commerce, data on 274 franchise offerings indicated that only six
franchisors required $100,000 or more in "equitable capital."' 30 ' The
theory of the exemption is that franchisors with a large and estab-
lished reputation are unlikely to engage in sales practice abuses, and
franchisees making such large investments are likely to be able to fend
for themselves.
The second conditional exemption is for franchisors who have of-
fered or are offering302 for sale fewer than ten franchises in the state
directly define "initial investment," and the term does not appear to have any indepen-
dent legal significance. Its meaning is narrower than the term "estimated total investment"
in the two disclosure provisions, id. §§ 19.100.030(4)(a)(vi), .040(9). "Estimated
total investment" is defined to include the initial franchise fee and other fees (whether
payable in one sum or in installments), working capital, deposits, prepaid expenses, fixed
assets, (however financed), real property (however financed), leases for real property or
fixed assets, and "all other goods and services which the franchisee will be required to pur-
chase or lease." Id. "Initial investment" should include the immediate cash outlay re-
quired of the franchisee. A key question is whether "initial investment" should also in-
clude property purchased by the franchisee and financed through contract, installment
purchase or lease. Since the figure of $100,000 is substantial, it seems likely that the
legislature did intend to include the cost of property financed and the present value of
leases on real and personal property. Items such as fees payable in installments should
not be included, however.
The exemption has proven to be somewhat difficult to apply where franchisors do not
set a minimum dollar investment. Kentucky Fried Chicken, for example, wrote that it
"does not require a franchisee to invest a specific sum of money in his business. How-
ever, a favorable location site, a specified type of building, and certain specified equip-
ment are required. We believe that the land, building and equipment would certainly
represent an investment in excess of$100,000. However, franchisees are not required to
disclose the amount of their investment to the Company." (Letter from Kentucky Fried
Chicken to Bernard G. Lonctot, August 21, 1972). The administrator of the Act re-
sponded that the tests of the exemption did not appear to have been met. (Letter from
Bernard G. Lonctot to Kentucky Fried Chicken, August 23, 1972). This conclusion
seems correct in the light of the Act's requirement that "the burden of proving an excep-
tion or an exemption from definition is upon the person claiming it." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.100.220 (Supp. 1972).
300. An examination of the claims of exemptions filed with the director reveals that
this exemption applies to few franchisors that are not also exempt under the second
conditional exemption (10 or fewer franchises). If a franchisor requires a minimum in-
vestment of $100,000 or more, it is unlikely to have sold or be offering more than ten
franchises in the state of Washington.
301. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISE COMPANY DATA
(1970). The six are: Airway Rent-A-Car System (car rentals), Redi-Spuds of America
(food processing), Gamble-Skogmo (general merchandising store), Holiday Inns
(motel-hotel), Quality Courts Motels (motel-hotel), and Sheraton Inns (motel-hotel).
302. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.030(4)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1972). The statute is grammati-
cally defective, reading "has and is offering for sale fewer than ten franchises." What is
intended (apparently) is that a franchisor may offer and sell up to 10 franchises in the
state after which he may sell no more-ever-without registering or finding another
exemption. The exemption is presumably not available to a franchisor who sold ten
franchises prior to enactment of the Act. Cf. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.900 (Supp. 1972).
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of Washington and who do not advertise franchises in any advertising
medium located in Washington or Oregon.30 3 This exemption al-
lowing up to "ten bites" is unsound on policy grounds. A prospective
franchisee's need for the protection offered by registration under the
Act does not depend on the number of franchises a franchisor is of-
fering in Washington. The financial burden of registration is not so
great as to unduly hamper franchisors who make a small number of
offerings in the state. This exemption, added to the Act as part of the
1972 amendment package, seemingly reflects the lobbying clout of the
franchise industry and the International Franchise Association.
The third conditional exemption304 is even less sound than the
second. Two statutory prerequisites exist: (1) the franchisor must not
charge an annual franchise fee in excess of $1,500305 and (2) the fran-
chisor must not advertise franchises in any medium located in Wash-
ington or Oregon. This exemption allows unlimited offerings of inex-
pensive franchises to persons in Washington without registration with
the director. It is totally incompatible with the general legislative in-
tent to protect persons with limited business sophistication who invest
a substantial portion of their savings in a franchise business. The ex-
emption should be repealed.
It should be stressed that the conditional exemptions only apply to
the registration provisions of the Act. Franchises sold under the ex-
emptions remain subject to the antifraud and fair practices sections of
the Act.306
(d) The "Hertz-Avis" Exemption. The final exemption 307 is also
conditional, requiring that: (1) the franchisor provide prospective
303. Id. § 19.100.030(4)(b)(ii). No reason is apparent why the contiguous state of
Oregon is included but that of Idaho is not. "Advertising medium" should be construed
broadly to cover all methods of soliciting the public-including general telephone and
mail campaigns and booths at fairs. See the broad definition of "advertisement" and
"publish" in WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(1), (13) (Supp. 1972), discussed in notes
232, 233 and accompanying text supra.
304. Id. § 19.100.030(4)(b)(iii).
305. There are problems in applying the $1500 per year franchise fee test. First,
many franchisors require a substantial initial payment. Such a lump sum payment is
included in the statutory definition of a franchise fee. WASH. REV. CODE §
19.100.010(11) (Supp. 1972). Ifa franchisor charges an initial fee in excess of$1500 but
a continuing annual charge or royalty of less than $1500, is the test met? Second, many
franchisors charge a royalty which is stated as a percentage of the franchisee's sales.
Hence the size of the annual franchise fee cannot always be determined at the time of
the offering.
•306. Id. §9 19.100.170, .180(2).
307. Id. § 19.100.030(5).
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franchisees with certain disclosures, 308 (2) the franchisor have a "clean
record," 30 9 (3) the franchisor or its parent corporation have a net
worth of more than $5 million, (4) the franchisor be "engaged in the
business of renting or leasing motor vehicles through an interdepen-
dent system of direct and franchised operations in interstate com-
merce in twenty or more states" and (5) the franchisor be "subject to
the jurisdiction of the federal trade commission and the federal anti-
trust laws." 31 0 The exemption differs from the other conditional ex-
emptions in that it frees the franchisor not only from the registration
requirement but also from the specific provisions of the fair practices
section. 31 '
A moment's reflection reveals that the exemption can apply to only
a few corporations: to wit, Hertz, Avis, National Car Rental. Such
private exemptions are unseemly to say the least. 312
B. 4dministrative Regulation and Procedures
1. Registration of Franchise Offerings
To comply with the registration requirement, a franchisor must file
a registration statement with the director (the administrator of securi-
ties) and pay a $500 filing fee.31 3 The registration becomes effective
15 business days after the filing date or the date of the last amendment
unless the director either accelerates the effective date or initiates a
stop order proceeding. 3 14 The registration is effective for one year
and, absent any contrary determination by the director, can be re-
308. See notes 292, 293 and accompanying text supra.
309. See note 294 and accompanying text supra.
310. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.030(5) (Supp. 1972).
311. Id. § 19.100.180(2). The franchisor remains subject only to the general require-
ment of the fair practices section that the "parties shall deal with each other in good
faith." Id. § 19.100.180(1).
312. The exemption actually does not create a closed class, however, and probably
is not subject to attack on the basis of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution or WASH CONST. art. I, § 12. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
313. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.100.040, .240(1) (Supp. 1972). From the effective
date of the Franchise Act (May 1, 1972) to September 27, 1972, 20 registration
statements for franchise offerings were filed; 13 became effective.
All administrative powers under the Act are given to the Director of the Department
of Motor Vehicles. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(3) (Supp. 1972). In turn, the Director
may delegate administration of the Act to the Administrator of Securities. Id. §
19.100.270. For a description of the operation of the Washington Securities Division,
see Rooks, The Blue Sky of Washington: Registration of Securities of a New Venture, 6
GONZAGA L. REV. 187, 192-95 (1971).
314. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.060 (Supp. 1972).
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newed annually by application and payment of a $100 filing fee.3 15
The franchisor must fie a supplemental report with the director on
any "material adverse change in the condition of the franchise" as
soon as reasonably possible and before further sale of franchises. 316
The registration procedure is similar to qualifying for registration
under the Washington Securities Act.317 The one point of substantive
difference is the annual renewal requirement imposed by the Fran-
chise Act. Under the Securities Act, registration is effective until re-
voked or terminated by request, 318 subject to an obligation to keep
information in the registration statement reasonably current.31 9
2. Stop Order Proceedings
The director is authorized by the Act to issue a stop order denying,
suspending, or revoking the effectiveness of a registration statement
"if he finds that the order is in the public interest" and that one of the
alternative statutory grounds is present.3 20 The seven statutory
grounds for a stop order, adopted nearly verbatim from the stop
order provisions of the Washington Securities Act, 321 are: (1)
incomplete, false or misleading information in the registration
statement, (2) violation by the franchisor or related persons of the Act
or any order issued thereunder, (3) existence of an injunction issued
by a competent court against the franchise offering on facts consti-
tuting a separate ground for a stop order, (4) illegality of the fran-
chised business, (5) tendency of the franchise offering to "work a
fraud upon purchasers," (6) violation of an escrow or impound order,
and (7) failure to pay registration fees (grounds only for temporary
denial). The scope of the fifth ground-tendency to "work a fraud
upon purchasers -is not clear. It could be limited to deceptive fran-
chise offerings in which the franchisor misrepresents facts, tells
"half-truths," or fails to disclose material information. A broader in-
terpretation, more consistent with the remedial purposes of the Act,
would extend the concept of fraud and allow the director to assess the
315. Id. § 19.100.070(l), (2).
316. Id. § 19.100.070(3).
317. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.210, .220, .240-.260 (1959) and §§ 21.20.230, .270
(Supp. 1972); see generally Rooks, supra note 313, at 204-06.
318. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.260 (1959).
319. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.270 (Supp. 1972).
320. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.120 (Supp. 1972).
321. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.280 (1959).
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merits of the franchise being offered and determine whether it in-
volves financial risks which ordinary investors cannot be expected to
understand no matter how full the disclosure of information. 322
The Act requires that notice be given to the applicant and that
written findings of fact and conclusions of law be entered by the
director in stop order proceedings.3 23 The Act further provides that a
hearing may be held, either upon order by the director or upon a
timely request by the applicant, after notice of the stop order and
prior to the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.324
3. Registration of Brokers and Selling Agents
The Act requires persons who offer to sell franchises subject to the
registration requirement of the Act to register as franchise brokers or
selling agents and prohibits franchisors from employing brokers or
agents unless they are registered. 325 Persons register by paying a
$50.00 fee and by filing an application containing information re-
quired by the director on matters such as the applicant's form and
place of organization, method of doing business, qualifications and
business history, financial condition and history, and history of any
violations of securities laws.32 6
Ordinarily, a requirement in a regulatory statute that brokers,
agents and salesmen register with an administrative agency is accom-
panied by provisions which authorize the agency to deny, suspend or
revoke the registration on various grounds such as insolvency, convic-
tion of certain crimes, or commission of "dishonest or unethical prac-
322. Originally, the director was given authority to issue a stop order on the ground
that "the applicant has failed to demonstrate that adequate financial arrangements have
been made to fulfill obligations to provide real estate improvements, equipment, train-
ing, or other items included in the offering." This ground was eliminated by the 1972
amendment package. Ch. 116, § 8 [ 1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. Consequently, if the
director questions the franchisor's financial ability to perform, the only other avenue
which will be open to him to protect prospective franchisees is imposition of an escrow
or impound of franchise fees. See notes 3 32-45 and accompanying text infra.
323. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.130 (Supp. 1972). The stop order procedure is
identical to that under the Washington Securities Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.300
(1959). Stop orders are most commonly entered by the administrator to prevent an in-
complete or otherwise inadequate registration statement from becoming effective auto-
matically 15 days after filing.
324. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.130 (Supp. 1972).
325. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.140 (Supp. 1972).
326. Id. § 19.100.140(3). As of September 27, 1972, 15 persons had registered as
brokers or selling agents under the Act with the normal pattern being one registered
agent for each registered franchise offering.
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tices. ' '327 No such provisions are included in the Franchise Act. The
reason for the omission is not evident; most likely, it was merely an
oversight of the draftsmen. As a result, however, there is serious doubt
whether the administrator of the Franchise Act has the power to re-
voke the registration of brokers and selling agents. Of course, if the
misconduct by the broker or selling agent actually constitutes a viola-
tion of the Act and is committed in connection with a registered fran-
chise offering, the administrator can issue a stop order revoking the
effectiveness of the franchisor's registration statement.328 But that
power still falls far short of the authority granted to administrators of
other similar regulatory statutes.3 29 The omission should be cured
promptly by amendment of the Franchise Act.
The Act requires persons offering franchises for sale to keep and
maintain a complete set of records of sales and the disposition of pro-
ceeds.330 It also requires such persons to file reports on franchises sold
and the disposition of the proceeds derived therefrom "at such times
as are required by the director" in the office of the director.33'
4. Impounding of Franchise Fees
The Act authorizes the director to require as a prerequisite of effec-
tive registration that franchise fees be impounded or placed in escrow
327. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.110 (1959) (securities broker-dealers, sales-
men, and investment advisers); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.17.530 (1959) (insurance agents
and brokers).
328. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.120(2) (Supp. 1972).
329. See note 327 supra. To illustrate the potential hiatus which the Act apparently
creates, consider a hypothetical franchisor who discloses in its registration application
that its president and its chief salesman were both found guilty two years before of crim-
inal fraud involving the sale of securities. That information apparently would not con-
stitute grounds for entrance of a stop order by the administrator. WASH. REV. CODE §
19.100.120 (Supp. 1972); Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31115(e) (West Supp. 1972). There
are apparently no grounds for denying registration of the two individuals as broker-
agents. And the fact of the fraud convictions would not even have to be disclosed to
prospective franchisees in the offering circular. See text accompanying note 362 infra.
330. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.150 (Supp. 1972). Read literally, section 15 of the
Act applies to any person offering franchises for sale -whether-or not the franchise of-
fering or the person making it must be registered under the Act. The intent of the legis-
lature, however, probably was to apply section 15 only to franchise brokers and agents
who are required to register under the Act.
The administrator of the Act has adopted a rule detailing the records which franchise
brokers and selling agents must make and keep. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-82-200 (1972).
Such records must be preserved for a period of not less than six years.
331. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.150 (Supp. 1972). The administrator of the Act has
not as yet adopted a rule requiring regular reports to be filed. He has indicated infor-
mally an intent to require quarterly reports.
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if he finds "such requirement is necessary and appropriate to protect
prospective franchisees. 33 2 The escrow provision is in response to
evidence that in the past persons have paid substantial fees for fran-
chises which were delivered only after inordinate delay or were never
delivered due to the franchisor's financial inability to perform. 333
Undercapitalized franchisors often rely upon further franchise sales to
sustain their normal operations. The result is a chain: "When the
chain is broken by a lag in the sale of franchises, having neither ade-
quate capital nor sufficient income from the percentage of gross sales
of franchisees to carry on routine operations, the franchisor closes his
doors and moves on, leaving behind a string of unfulfilled obligations
to franchisees, suppliers, contractors, employees, and others."334
Rules adopted by the administrator of the Franchise Act specify the
standards and procedures for impounding franchise fees. Impounding
will be ordered "where the applicant has failed to demonstrate that
adequate financial arrangements have been made to fulfill obligations
to provide real estate, improvements, equipment, inventory, training
or other items included in the offering .... ,,35 Where impounding is
imposed, the entire franchise fee and all other funds paid by franchis-
ees must be delivered within 48 hours to a depository-a separate
trust account with a national bank located in Washington or a Wash-
ington bank or trust company. 336 The administrator will authorize a
release of some or all of the impounded funds "upon a showing that
the franchisor has fulfilled its obligations under the franchise agree-
332. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.050 (Supp. 1972).
333. See, e.g., Interim Hearing on Franchises Before the California Senate Comm.
on Insurance and Financial Institutions 27-28 (Sacramento, Nov. 7, 1969); Augustine &
Hrusoff, FRANCHISE REGULATION, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1970).
The need for the protection which impounding can provide against grossly undercapi-
talized franchise schemes is illustrated by testimony of a motel franchisor who sold 70
franchises in a one year period at $12,000 each under a lease-back scheme requiring the
franchisor to provide operating capital, furnishings and staff. The franchisor incurred
obligations in excess of $14 million. In fact, the franchisor's financial statement showed
total assets of $250,000 and liabilities of approximately $2,000,000. Hearings on the
Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural
Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 215-17 (1970).
334. Pierno, Franchise Regulation: The Need for a New Approach, 44 L.A.B. BULL.
501, 505 (1969).
335. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-410 (1972). The impound rules are copied virtually
verbatim from rules under the California Franchise Investment Act. CAL. AD. CODE tit.
10, § 310.112-.113.4 (1965). The only difference is that the Washington rules do not
allow the franchisor to post a surety bond in lieu of impounding. Id. § 310.113.5.
336. WASH. AD. CODE §§ 460-80-420,-430,-440 (1972).
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ment, or that for other reasons the impound is no longer required for
protection of franchisees. '337
Granting the administrator authority to require that franchise fees
be placed in escrow has been criticized. First, it is argued that "disclo-
sure of what will be done with franchise funds is adequate. ' 338 This
argument is not persuasive; disclosure of mere promises often is not
adequate,339 and the argument assumes that prospective franchisees
with limited financial sophistication are capable of carefully assessing
the financial risks of the transaction: The evidence suggests that pro-
spective franchisees may not be so capable.3 40 Second, it is argued
that "it is too easy for the practice to become established as the 'safe'
practice that all funds will be escrowed and only released when the
franchised business is delivered. '341 The experience to date in Wash-
ington does not substantiate this argument. Of the 13 franchise regis-
trations which have become effective in the first five months since the
Act went into effect, the administrator has impounded franchise fees
in only one instance.3 42 Third, it is argued that "the franchisor may
need a portion of the proceeds to equip the business for the fran-
chisee."343 However, the impounding rules do allow release of por-
tions of the franchise fee,344 while properly discouraging franchises
promoted by bootstrap financing with funds of small investors. Fi-
nally, it is argued that authority to impound requires the administrator
to "make subjective determinations over subjects with which he may
be totally unfamiliar. 3 45 In fact, the state securities administrator is
very experienced in assessing investment schemes; if the subject matter
cannot be explained to and comprehended by the administrator, the
franchisor should not be free to sell franchises to the public without
safeguards.
337. Id. § 460-80-450.
338. Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 333, at 1380.
339. More helpful than disclosure of promises would be concrete data on the fran-
chisor's prior performance in delivering franchises. The proposed Federal Trade Com-
mission Rule, for example, requires disclosure of "the number of persons who have
signed franchise agreements for whom a site has not yet been agreed upon by both fran-
chisor and franchisee" and "the average length of time between the signing of a franchise
agreement and the opening of the franchisee's outlet." See note 290 supra.
340. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
341. Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 333, at 1380.
342. Abbey Carpet of Nevada, Inc., Washington Securities Administrator File F-5.
343. Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 333, at 1380.
344. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-450 (1972).
345. Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 333, at 1380.
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5. Control of Advertising
The Act provides that no person shall publish in the state an adver-
tisement offering a franchise subject to the registration requirement of
the Act unless a copy of the advertisement has been filed with the
director seven days in advance. 346 The director is given summary
power to prohibit the publication of such an advertisement if he finds
that it is false or misleading.3 47 A person subject to such an order may
obtain a hearing by requesting that the order be rescinded.348
The administrator of the Franchise Act has adopted a rule con-
taining a statement of policy governing franchise advertisements. 349
The statement of policy prohibits: (1) any statement implying that the
franchise is a "safe investment"; (2) any projection of future fran-
chisee earnings, unless substantiated by data derived from franchises
operating under similar conditions; 350 (3) any advertisement made
without the name and address of the person making it; (4) endorse-
ments by public figures without full disclosure of the compensation
paid or promised to such persons; and (5) any statement referring to
exemptions from or reductions in taxation, unless based on the
opinion of legal counsel (who must be named).
It should be stressed that the statutory definitions of "advertising"
and "publish" are very broad.351 For example, all printed material
prepared for dissemination to the public "in connection with an offer
or sale of a franchise" is subject to the filing requirements of the Act.35 2
C. Disclosure Requirements and Standards
1. Delivery of Offering Circular to Prospective Franchisee
One of the primary purposes of the Franchise Act is to curb fran-
chise sales abuses by requiring full and accurate disclosure of material
346. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.100 (Supp. 1972). For a discussion of when an
advertisement is published "in the state," see text accompanying notes 241-251 supra.
347. Id.§ 19.100.110.
348. Id.
349. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-500 (1972). The statement of policy is similar to that
adopted in California. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10 § 310.156.1 (1971); see also WASH, AD.
CODE § 460-28-010 (1972) (rule relating to advertising of securities in Washington).
350. Cf. the requirements for disclosure of earnings projections in the offering cir-
cular, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.100.030(4)(a)(xiv), .040(17), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 385-96 infra.
351. See notes 232, 233 supra.
352. Id.
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information to the prospective franchisee. 353 The object of such a
disclosure requirement is to get information into the buyer's hands in
a timely fashion so that the buyer may use it in arriving at an invest-
ment decision. Unfortunately, the disclosure mechanism adopted in
the Franchise Act is not adequate to achieve this goal.
The Franchise Act requires that the franchisor present a disclosure
document (offering circular) to a prospective franchisee "at least
forty-eight hours prior to the sale of the franchise."3 54 This procedure
is inadequate for at least two reasons. First, 48 hours is simply not
enough time for the prospective franchisee to digest the material infor-
mation. Although a prospective franchisee can ask for more time to
study the information before signing a franchise agreement, franchi-
sors can be expected to press for an early closing of the deal in order
not to lose a sale. Second, at a point 48 hours before the tentative sale,
the prospective franchisee has probably already made an investment
decision on the basis of the franchisor's sales talk and sales material
which need not contain all the information required to be in the of-
fering circular. The effects of the unrestricted sales material cannot be
superseded instantly by the offering circular. 355
The approach of the proposed Federal Trade Commission Rule is
superior to the Franchise Act in this respect. The FTC rule would
require that the franchisor furnish the prospective franchisee with the
prescribed disclosure document "at the time when contact is first es-
tablished," which is defined as the earlier of the time when (1) "a
direct personal meeting first occurs" or (2) "any document or promo-
tional literature is distributed to a prospective franchisee."3 56 The
proposed FTC rule couples this early disclosure requirement with a
ten day "cooling-off' period during which the franchisee can freely
cancel any signed contract.357
The 48 hour provision apparently was adopted in Washington be-
cause it is included in the California Franchise Investment Act.358 It is
353. See text accompanying notes 211-14 supra.
354. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.080 (Supp. 1972). The rules of the administrator of
the Franchise Act require that a purchaser of a franchise sign a receipt that he or she has
received the offering circular 48 hours before signing the receipt and completing the
sale. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-300 (1972).
355. Cf. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943).
356. Proposed FTC Rule, supra note 260.
357. Id.
358. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31119 (West Supp. 1972).
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more lenient than the equivalent provision in the Washington Securi-
ties Act, 359 and should be replaced by a provision similar to either that
of the Washington Securities Act or that of the proposed FTC rule.
2. Contents of the Offering Circular
As originally enacted in 1971, section 8 of the Franchise Act re-
quired delivery of an "offering circular" to a prospective franchisee
without designating what information needed to be disclosed in the
offering circular.36 0 A permissible inference would have been that the
offering circular should contain all the information in the registration
statement filed with the director. The 1972 amendments deleted the
reference to "offering circular" and substituted the language "mate-
rials specified in section 2(4)(a) [the conditional exemption section]
of this 1972 amendatory act."3 61 Thus, the Franchise Act seems to
require that the offering circular contain only the information which
must be disclosed to prospective franchisees by a franchisor wishing to
qualify for a conditional registration exemption under the Act.
A comparison of the disclosures required in the conditional exemp-
tion section and the disclosures required in the registration statement
reveals that three key items of information included in the latter are
omitted from the former: (1) the business experience of persons affili-
ated with the franchisor, (2) any record of specified types of miscon-
duct on the part of persons identified in the registration statement, and
(3) the franchisor's financial statements. 362 There does not appear to
be any sound reason for keeping these three items of information out
of the hands of prospective franchisees. Information regarding the
franchisor's personnel and prior misconduct by those identified with
the registration is clearly material to a judgment as to the soundness
and desirability of a franchise offering. Similarly, the franchisor's
financial condition is relevant in assessing the franchisor's ability to
perform its obligations under the franchise agreement.
359. Under the Washington Securities Act, a statutory prospectus must precede the
first written offer made to a prospective investor by means other than a public advertise-
ment. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.230 (Supp. 1972). Since "offer" is broadly construed,
see note 246, a prospectus must precede or accompany any written or printed sales
material. The Washington Securities Act is not as strict as the Proposed FTC Rule,
however, since a prospectus need not be given before any direct personal meeting.
360. Ch. 252, § 8 [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
361. Ch. 116, § 6 [1972] Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess.; see note 293 supra.
362. See note 292 supra.
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The administrator of the Franchise Act has adopted rules which in
fact require the offering circular to include information other than
that specified in section 2(4)(a) of the Act. Included are: (1) the busi-
ness experience of the franchisor's personnel,363 (2) financial state-
ments of the franchisor,364 (3) any arrangement that the franchisor
has made with a public figure as to name use or endorsement,365 (4)
the number of franchises sold and proposed to be sold,366 and (5) the
obligations to be performed by the franchisor prior to the opening of
the franchised business. 367 Because the Franchise Act unjustifiably
fails to grant the administrator express general power to determine
what registration information must be included in the offering circu-
lar,368 a substantial question remains as to whether the administrator
has exceeded his statutory authority by so expanding the required
contents of the offering circular.369
3. Required Items of Disclosure-Projected Franchisee Earnings
The Act enumerates 20 specific items of information which the
franchisor must include in the registration statement. 370 The fran-
chisor also must append a copy of the "typical franchise contract or
agreement proposed for use including all amendments thereto. 371 In
addition the administrator of the Act is authorized to require addi-
tional information in the registration statement, 372 and the franchisor
363. The franchisor is required to list the names and addresses of its officers, direc-
tors, trustees, general partners, general manager and principal executive and indicate
the principal occupations of each during the past five years. WASH. AD. CODE §
460-80-130,-320 (1972).
364. Id. §§ 460-80-130(8),-320. The financial statements must be prepared in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles as set forth in the administra-
tor's accounting rules, id. § 460-60 et seq., and must be audited by a certified public
accountant unless the requirement of audited statements is waived by the director. Id. §
460-80-140.
365. Id. § 460-80-330(I1).
366. Id. §9 460-80-150,-330(12).
367. Id.§§ 460-80-130(24),-330(14).
368. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.230 (Supp. 1972). See notes 360, 361 and accompa-
nying text supra.
369. The administrator's authority to require disclosure of additional items of infor-
mation in ihe registration statement is clear. WASH. Ray. CODE § 19.100.040(20) (Supp.
1972). His authority to require them to be included in the offering circular presented to
prospective franchiees, however, is subject to the possible limiting effect of section 8 as
discussed in the text. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.250 (Supp. 1972).
370. Id. § 19.100.040.
371. Id. § 19.100.040(8).
372. Id. § 19.100.040(20). In fact the administrator specified three items'of informa-
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may include comments and additional information relative to the in-
formation contained in the statement.373
Of the 20 specific items of information, seven provide background
information on the franchisor's organization, experience, personnel,
and financial status.374 Five describe terms of the franchise agreement
which impose obligations on the franchisee, including conditions of
termination or renewal, conditions of transfer or resale, requirements
that the franchisee purchase goods or services from certain sources,
obligations or restrictions in the goods or services that the franchisee
may offer, and covenants not to compete.375 Four describe the finan-
cial terms and conditions affecting the franchisee, including franchisee
fees and royalties, other required fees, financing arrangements, and
the franchisor's intentions to assign the franchisee's note or contract.376
Finally, four items provide information relevant to a judgment on
the financial prospects of the franchise being offered, including the
training program, the supervision and assistance provided by the fran-
chisor, projected sales or earnings, prior franchisee business failures,
resales, and transfers in Washington, and the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of all operating franchises of the franchisor in
Washington. 377
The disclosure provisions of the Franchise Act, especially those
concerned with the financial prospects of the franchise, tend to be
incomplete. For example, disclosure of franchise failures, resales, and
transfers is limited to such events occurring in Washington state
during the previous two years. 378 These temporal and territorial limits
obviously dilute the value of this data to the prospective franchisee. 379
Another example is the provision requiring disclosure of the training
program, supervision and assistance the franchisor will provide the
tion not included in the statute which must be disclosed in the registration statement.
See text accompanying notes 365-67 supra.
373. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.040(23) (Supp. 1972).
374. Id. § 19.100.040 (1)-(7).
375. Id. § 19.100.040(11), (12), (13), (14), (22).
376. Id. § 19.100.040(9), (10), (15), (16). In requiring disclosure as to financing
terms and conditions, the Franchise Act fills a loophole in the federal Truth-in-Lending
Act which exempts from its disclosure provisions "credit transactions involving exten-
sions of credit for business or commercial purposes .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970);
see generally Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 STAN.
L. REV. 793, 809-16 (1972).
377. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.040(17), (18), (19), (21) (Supp. 1972).
378. Id. § 19.100.040(18).
379. The temporal and territorial limits were added in the 1972 amendment
package. Ch. 116, §§ 2-3 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
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franchisee.380 Although such information is of obvious importance to
an inexperienced franchisee contemplating investment in a business,
the Act seems to require disclosure of little more than promises.
Missing is concrete information on the franchisor's past performance
and present ability to perform his promises. In contrast with the Fran-
chise Act's weak disclosure requirements, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's Proposed Rule requires disclosure of (1) "the average length of
service of personnel who are responsible for assisting the franchisee at
his location," (2) "the average number of hours such personnel spent
during the past year with each franchisee that was in business for less
than one year," (3) "the number of hours of instruction" in a promised
training program, and (4) "a brief biography of the instructors who
will conduct the training."'3 81
The greatest failing of the disclosure provisions is its vague treat-
ment of information regarding prospective franchisee earnings.382 The
central concern of any prospective franchisee is the expected return
on the investment of money and effort in the franchise. Since misrep-
resentation of prospective franchisee earnings has been one of the
most persistent abuses in franchisor sales practices,383 the failure of
the Franchise Act to cope adequately with disclosure of prospective
earnings has to be viewed as its most serious shortcoming.
As originally enacted, the Franchise Act required "a statement of
earnings of past and present franchisees. 3 84 The provision focused on
concrete, historical data. However, it seemed to call for an unwieldy
amount of information-at least for large franchise systems. Further-
more, such information could be misleading if comparable data was
not supplied to contrast the proposed franchise site to the existing
franchises.
The 1972 amendments deleted the requirement that earnings of
past and present franchisees be disclosed and substituted the following
provision: 385
380. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.040(19) (Supp. 1972).
381. Proposed FTC Rule, supra note 260. The director may have the power under
his general rule-making authority to require more specific information on training pro-
grams and the like. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100. 250 (Supp. 1972). To date, however, he
has not done so. See WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-130 (1972) (repeating the statutory lan-
guage).
382. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.040(17) (Supp. 1972).
383. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
384. Ch. 252, § 4(18) [1971] Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess.
385. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.040(17) (Supp. 1972). As amended, the provision is
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A copy of any statement of estimated or projected franchisee sales or
earnings prepared for presentation to prospective franchisees or other
persons, together with a statement immediately following such state-
ment setting forth the data upon which the estimations or projections
are based and explaining clearly the manner and extent to which such
data relates to the actual operations of businesses conducted by the
franchisor or its franchisees.
The provision actually does not require the franchisor to disclose
earnings data. Many franchisors, for example, simply do not prepare
any statement of estimated sales or earnings.386 Since few prospective
franchisees would rationally invest in a franchise without having ac-
quired some information about prospective earnings from the fran-
chisor or its sales representative, the lack of any positive requirement
that earnings data be disclosed in the registration statement and of-
fering circular suggests that many franchisees will acquire such infor-
mation only through unregulated sales talk.
Furthermore, on its face the provision does not require that esti-
mates or projections be substantiated in any particular manner. The
franchisor only need disclose the data upon which an estimation is
based and disclose the extent to which the data relates to actual busi-
ness operations of the franchisor or its franchisees. In contrast to this
lenient statutory disclosure provision is a rule promulgated by the
administrator which prohibits projection of future franchisee earnings
in advertising unless the projection is "(i) based on past earnings rec-
ords of all franchisees operating under conditions, including location,
substantially similar to conditions affecting franchises being offered,
(ii) for a reasonable period only, and (iii) substantiated by data
which clearly supports such projections." 387 It is not clear whether the
administrator's rule is meant to control the disclosures of earnings
projections pursuant to the statute. 388 But the administrator's require-
ment that projections be substantiated by actual performance of fran-
chisees operating under comparable conditions clearly is preferable.
similar to the comparable provision of the California Franchise Investment Law, CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31111 (p) (West Supp. 1972).
386. See, e.g., Success Motivation Institution, Washington Securities Administrator
File F-4 ("It is the policy of the Company never to estimate or project distributorship
earnings ...").
387. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-500(b) (1972).
388. Any statement of projected franchisee earnings prepared for general circulation
to prospective franchisees would seem to constitute "advertising" and hence to be sub-
ject to the administrators' control. See text accompanying notes 346-52 supra.
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Two examples taken from franchise registration statements on file
with the administrator of the Act illustrate the weakness of the stat-
ute's treatment of earnings disclosures.
Taco Time International.89 This franchisor of fast food outlets in-
cluded in its registration statement a chart which estimated the net
earnings a franchisee could expect to earn at various levels of gross
sales. The chart may be helpful in determining probable expenses, but
no data is given in the chart which indicates what level of sales can be
expected from a given site or what factors tend to determine the level
of sales. Moreover, no data is given indicating the number of fran-
chisees, if any, which have generated such volume of sales and whether
in fact the sales/net-earnings relationship was that portrayed by the
chart.
Commercial Courier Service.390 The franchisor is in the business of
providing private delivery of promotional sales materials to homes. A
franchisee pays a one-time fiat fee of $1 per home to obtain an area
franchise. The franchisor obtains orders to deliver material at the rate
of $40 per thousand and remits 50 percent of the gross proceeds to
the franchisee. The franchisee then hires carriers to deliver the ma-
terial at a rate of $5 per piece per 500 homes. Included in the registra-
tion statement is an elaborate chart in grid form indicating potential
weekly earnings of a franchisee. The chart indicates for example, that
for a $2500 investment (2500 homes) a prospect can make $25 per40 2500
week if one piece is delivered [(2.5 X 40- (5 X 2500 $25 net]
and $250 per week if ten pieces are delivered. Despite the franchisor's
cautionary preface that "no predictions have been made about actual
prospective earnings, because the company is too young to have reli-
able data for estimating," the clear implication of the chart is that an
investing franchisee can expect to reap healthy profits from 25% per
year on up. Yet the chart does not provide any data as to (1) the
franchisor's present or future ability to secure any advertising or sam-
ples at the $40 rate, (2) the status of competition to the franchisor's
services (e.g., inserts in Sunday newspapers or mail delivery), or (3) the
availability of carriers at the $5 rate.391
389. Taco Time International, Washington Securities Administrator File F-12.
390. Commercial Courier Service, Washington Securities Administrator File F-11.
391. With regard to securities sales, this type of earnings "estimate" based on hypo-
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The Franchise Act does give access to hard data on franchise earn-
ings by requiring that the franchisor disclose the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of all operating franchisees located in Wash-
ington.392 The provision enables a prospect to contact franchisees di-
rectly and obtain information on expected franchise earnings. The
provision is not an adequate substitute for a requirement of full disclo-
sure of earnings data, however. The prospect may be too timid to call
other franchisees; franchisees may be hesitant to discuss their financial
affairs; there may be few existing franchises in Washington, or the
existing ones may not be operating under comparable conditions.
The approach to earnings disclosure in the proposed Federal Trade
Commission rule is far better than that in the Washington Franchise
Act. The FTC rule requires that upon request a franchisor provide a
prospective franchisee with the profit and loss statements of all ex-
isting franchises, with names and addresses omitted. In addition, any
representation as to potential income has to be based on "actual av-
erage figures for all franchises not owned or operated by the
franchisor... in operation during the entire preceding twelve-month
period" and be accompanied by a specific disclaimer. 393 If no inde-
pendent franchisors operated during the preceding year, any represen-
tation of potential income would have to be "based upon sound ac-
counting practices"3 94 and be accompanied by a specific disclaimer.3 95
The franchisor also must disclose the number of franchises that oper-
ated at a loss during the previous year.
The proposed FTC rule, while an improvement over the Wash-
thetical sales figures for an untried business has been held to be misleading despite a
cautionary preface. "[T] hese statements lend an appearance of predictability of future
profits which is improper for a corporation which has yet to start business. Although
stated as an estimate of future profits, the use of definite figures is misleading." Thomas
Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60, at 71 (1939).
392. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.040(21) (Supp. 1972).
393. Proposed FTC Rule (c)(1), supra note 260. The disclaimer would have to be
conspicuously displayed and state: "Representations are based on the average earnings
or profits of all independent franchisees in operation during the past year. These figures
should not be considered as accurate representations of potential earnings or profits of
any specific franchisee."
394. Since accountants generally do not make predictions or representations of fu-
ture earnings, the FTC's use of the qualification "based upon sound accounting prac-
tices" may be misleading.
395. Proposed FTC Rule (c)(2), supra note 260. The disclaimer must state: "All
Representations of Potential Earnings or Profits Are Merely Estimates; No Franchisee
Has Been in Operation Long Enough to Indicate What, If Any, Actual Earnings or
Profits May Result."
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ington Franchise Act, still does not impose a categorical duty to dis-
close adequate data on franchise earnings. An adequate disclosure of
earnings requires a summary of actual earnings data in the form of a
distribution table. Chart I illustrates such a distribution table.
CHART I
% of total in
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Earnings Distribution of XYZ Franchises in thousands of dollars
Chart I illustrates the weakness in the proposed FTC rule's reliance
on average earnings figures; an average figure often will greatly ex-
ceed the median earnings figure due to a few high earning franchises.
Franchisors easily could construct distribution tables from the exten-
sive data they normally collect on the sales and earnings of their fran-
chises. Earnings data might be made even more meaningful to pro-
spective franchisees if the franchisor were required to construct and
present a table based on simple linear regression analysis whenever
the franchisor knows that an identifiable factor has a significant effect
on franchisee earnings. Chart II (p. 368) illustrates such a table.
Regression analysis can actually be used with any number of variable
factors.3 96 Requiring such information, at least from experienced fran-
chisors, would not represent an intolerable burden. Many franchisors
undoubtedly have collected and analyzed data in such a fashion.
396. W. WALLIS & H. ROBERTS, STATISTICS: A NEw APPROACH 524-58 (1956).
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CHART II
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4. Section Seventeen-The Antifraud Provisions
Perhaps the most important part of the Franchise Act is section 17.397
Subsection 17(1) makes it unlawful to include an untrue statement
of material fact in a document filed with the director or to wilfully
omit a material fact required to be stated in such a document. Within
the ambit of this subsection are both the registration statement and the
offering circular.3 98 Three other provisions of section 17 generally
deal with problems of fraud and misrepresentation. Subsection 17(2)
prohibits the offer or sale of a franchise in the state by means of a
written or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of
a material fact or omits a material fact necessary to prevent the state-
ments made from being misleading. Subsection 17(3) prohibits em-
ployment of any device to defraud, and subsection 17(4) prohibits any
act or practice which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.
Subsections 17(2)-(4) are copied verbatim from Rule 10b-5 of the
397. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.170 (Supp. 1972). Civil remedies for violation of
section 17 are found in section 19. Id. § 19.100.190(2), discussed at notes 480-99 and
accompanying text infra.
398. The administrator of the Act requires that the offering circular be filed along
with the registration statement. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-80-130(30) (1972).
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Securities and Exchange Commission and from section 20.010 of the
Securities Act of Washington. 399 Adoption of the proscriptions used in
dealing with security frauds clearly indicates that the same broad stan-
dards of fair dealing developed by the courts under the securities laws
should apply under the Franchise Act. A key precedent is the recent
Washington decision in Shermer v. Baker40 which interpreted "mate-
rial fact" as meaning "a fact to which a reasonable man would attach
importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question" and which held that common law fraud and, in particular,
an intent to deceive need not be shown under the Securities Act of
Washington.
Section 17 clearly prohibits all variety of misrepresentations, mis-
leading statements, and misleading omissions in connection with the
sale of franchises. A major question is whether the Washington courts
will read into section 17 a fiduciary duty of full and affirmative disclo-
sure upon franchisors in the sales of franchises. The equivalent anti-
fraud rules of the securities laws have been read to impose such a duty
upon corporate "insiders" in their dealings with "outsiders."'40 ' While
the analogy is not perfect,402 the adoption of such a principle seems
clearly justified in light of the legislature's manifest concern with fran-
chise sales practice abuses.
It bears stressing that the antifraud rules apply even if the sale of a
franchise is exempt from the registration requirement of the Franchise
Act.403
D. The Fair Practices or "Franchisee Bill of Rights" Section
Although the disclosure and registration provisions of the Wash-
399. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972); WASH. Rav. CODE § 21.20.010 (1959).
400. 2 Wn. App. 845, 855-58, 472 P.2d 589, 595-97 (1970).
401. E.g., Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 850-55, 472 P.2d 589, 593-95 (1970).
402. In the corporate setting, the buying or selling of securities on the basis of inside
information is considered improper partly because of the notion that "a corporate fidu-
ciary, who is entrusted with potentially valuable information, may not appropriate that
asset to his own use." Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
In a franchise setting, there is no equivalent divergence of interests since the franchisor
would be using its own undisclosed information for its own benefit (i.e., the sale of a
franchise on terms it may not be able to obtain with full disclosure of all material facts).
Still many of the same factors that have led to the creation of a fiduciary duty of dis-
closure in other contexts are present in the franchisor-prospective franchisee relation-
ship. See text accompanying notes 52, 53 supra.
403. See text accompanying notes 269-72 supra.
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ington Franchise Investment Protection Act follow the basic pattern
of the California Franchise Investment Act,404 the Fair Practices sec-
tion of the Washington Act (section 18) is unique.40 5 Imposing specific
restrictions on the terms of franchise agreements and on the behavior
of franchisors, section 18 represents an effort by the legislature to alter
the balance of bargaining power between franchisor and franchisee.
Such direct intervention by the state into the ecomomic relationship
between private parties is bound to be controversial. 406 It should be
no surprise, therefore, that section 18 of the Washington Franchise
Act gained nationwide notoriety40 7 and was the object of extensive
amendments in the 1972 legislative session. 408
Subsection 1 of section 18 states generally that "the parties shall
deal with each other in good faith, '409 while the second subsection
enumerates 11 specific acts or practices which are prohibited.410 Ap-
parently, only the "good faith" obligation is imposed on the franchisee
as well as the franchisor. It is unclear what impact the general good
faith requirement will have beyond the specific provisions of section
18. The 11 specific prohibitions do not exhaust all of the areas in
which franchisors allegedly have abused their power to control fran-
chisees. One such area, apparently not dealt with in section 18(2), is
the common clause in franchise agreements prohibiting a franchisee
from transferring the franchise unless the franchisor approves the
transferee. 41' However, the courts may apply the general standard of
good faith and require a showing of reasonable grounds as a prerequi-
site to refusal.412
404. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3 1000 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).
405. The Automobile Dealers Acts, while similar in purpose, are much less specific
in their terms and much more confined in their coverage than section 18. See text ac-
companying notes 282-84 supra. Section 18 is patterned after a proposed franchise fair
dealing statute introduced in the Massachusetts legislature. Mass. H. 2279, reprinted in
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Business of the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 15 (1970).
406. See text preceding note 110 supra.
407. See Wong, In Absence of Federal Rules, More States Begin Regulating the
Franchise Industry, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 1971, at 22, col. 1-3.
408. Ch. 116, § 10 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
409. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.180(1) (Supp. 1972).
410. Id. § 19.100.180(2)(a)-(k).
411. Transfer restrictions might be considered a "standard of conduct" imposed on
the franchisee which must be reasonable under section 18(2)(h). But such an interpreta-
tion would involve a considerable expansion of the ordinary meaning of the phrase
"standard of conduct."
412. See generally Comment, Limiting the Franchisor's Power to Withhold Consent
to a Transfer by the Franchisee, 47 IND. L.J. 559 (1972).
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1. Right of Association
The Franchise Act prohibits franchisors from restricting or inhib-
iting "the right of the franchisees to join an association of franchis-
ees. ' 413 Since the statute merely invalidates "yellowdog" provisions in
franchise contracts, it accomplishes very little. The statute does not
actually guarantee the right of franchisees to associate for any pur-
pose. If franchisees were organized to bargain collectively with the
franchisor or to set retail prices, hours and the like, they could well be
in violation of the federal antitrust laws.414 If, on the other hand, the
franchisees are deemed to be "employees" of the franchisor, they
have a guaranteed right under the federal labor laws to bargain collec-
tively with their employer. 415 Neither of these questions is affected by
the Franchise Act.
2. Control of Sources of Supply---Unreasonable Prices-:--
"Kick-Backs"
Three provisions of section 18(2) deal with problems created by
franchisor control over franchisee sources of supply.41 6 Section
18(2)(b) prohibits a franchisor from requiring "a franchisee to pur-
chase or lease goods or services of the franchisor or approved sources
of supply unless.., the franchisor satisfies the burden of proving that
such restrictive purchasing agreements are reasonably necessary for a
lawful purpose justified on business grounds, and do not substantially
affect competition." The 1972 amendments added two provisions to
section 18(2)(b).417 The first exempts the "initial inventory of the fran-
chise." The purpose of this concession to franchisors is unclear. No
equivalent distinction between initial inventory and subsequent pur-
chases has been made under the federal antitrust laws. 418 The second
provision directs courts interpreting and applying section 18(2)(b) to
be "guided" by the decisions of federal courts under the antitrust laws.
413. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)(a) (Supp. 1972).
414. See Columbia River Packers v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942); Bambury Fash-
ions, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 477 (1969); see also McGuire, The Labor Law Aspects of Fran-
chising, 13 B.C. IND. &CoM. L. REV. 215, 251 n.137 (1971).
415. See, e.g., Mister Softee of Indiana, 162 N.L.R.B. 354 (1966); see generally,
McGuire, supra note 414.
416. See text accompanying notes 115, and 142-47 supra.
417. Ch. 116, § 10(2)(b) [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
418. See text accompanying notes 174-95 supra.
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Since the legislative intent is to avoid creation of differing state and
federal standards on the legality of franchise tying agreements, 419 sec-
tion 18(2)(b) will have little impact on supply restrictions and will be
invoked only when a plaintiff franchisee perceives jurisdictional, pro-
cedural, or remedial advantages to a state court action rather than a
federal court antitrust action. 420
Section 18(2)(d) prohibits a franchisor from selling, renting or of-
fering to sell to a franchisee "any product or service for more than a
fair and reasonable price. ' '421 This provision presumably was enacted
to protect franchisees who are subject to purchase restrictions which
pass muster under section 18(2)(b) and under the federal antitrust
laws.
Section 18(2)(e) deals with "kick-backs" to the franchisor from
suppliers with whom the franchisee deals. The 1971 provision prohib-
ited kick-backs by requiring that any payment received by a fran-
chisor from a supplier be "promptly accounted for and transmitted to
the franchisee. '422 The 1972 amendments eliminated this requirement
and substituted a disclosure approach requiring the franchisor to
provide a prospective franchisee with "a statement of whether and of
the means by which the franchisor derives income from" franchisee
purchases of supplies from designated sources. 423 In turn, section
18(2)(e) was amended to require only that the franchisor disclose to
the franchisee any benefit received from a supplier with whom a fran-
chisee deals. 424 This presumably means that the franchisor must give
to the franchisee a statement of the exact amounts received as they are
received describing from whom they are received.425
Sections 18(2)(d) and 18(2)(e) appear to be inconsistent in theory.
419. For a discussion of the federal antitrust law's impact on franchisor control of
franchisees' sources of supply, see text beginning at note 174 supra.
420. One consideration clearly favoring a federal action is the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act's limitation of treble damages to $1000. WASH. REV. CODE §
19.86.090 (Supp. 1972). See text accompanying note 503 infra. The federal antitrust
laws give an unlimited right to treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
421. "Fair and reasonable price" is a vague term but should be interpreted to mean
"bona fide wholesale price." Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(11) (Supp. 1972).
422. Ch. 252, § 18(2)(e) [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. For a discussion of the
legality of controlling sources of supplies, see note 142 and accompanying text supra.
423. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.100.030(4)(a)(x), .040(13) (Supp. 1972).
424. Ch. 116, § 10(2)(e) [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
425. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)(e) speaks of disclosing such benefit, refer-
ring back to "money, goods, services, anything of value, or any other benefit, from any
other person with whom the franchisee does business"-which implies a particularized
disclosure.
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If franchisor control over the franchisees' sources of supply is justified
by the need for quality control or other reasons, the franchisor can
require franchisees to purchase supplies either (1) through the fran-
chisor or (2) from approved sources of supply. If the franchisor sells
supplies directly, only a "reasonable price" no higher than market
price can be extracted. On the other hand, if the franchisee is forced
to deal with approved suppliers, the suppliers can charge a higher
than competitive price, relying on the necessity of franchisor approval
as insulation from competition. The supplier may split the profits with
the franchisor, so long as there is full disclosure of the kick-back. The
two sections should consistently follow either the disclosure theory or
the prohibitory theory.
3. Discrimination Between Franchisees
Section 18(2)(c) prohibits franchisors from discriminating between
franchisees "in the charges offered or made for royalties, goods, ser-
vices, equipment, rentals, advertising services, or in any other business
dealing" unless the franchisor shows that such discrimination is (1)
"reasonable," (2) "based on franchises granted at materially different
times" and is "reasonably related to such difference in times" or based
"on other proper and justifiable distinctions considering the purposes"
of the Franchise Act, and (3) "not arbitrary." The section has a dual
impact. It forces uniformity in the terms of franchise agreements and
requires equality in the enforcement of franchise terms and exercise of
franchisors' reserved powers.
The requirement that franchise terms such as the royalty rate be
uniform is questionable on policy grounds, and the legislative ra-
tionale for such a requirement is unclear. The draftsmen of the Act
commented that "the prohibition of price discrimination by a fran-
chisor among its various franchisees is founded on the Robinson-
Patman Act. '426 The Robinson-Patman Act, however, only pro-
hibits discrimination in price between different purchasers of the same
product where the effect is to lessen competition among the pur-
chasers or among the seller and his competitors.427 Since section
426. Fletcher, supra note 211, Appendix I at 7.
427. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 649-83
(1967).
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18(2)(c) applies regardless of the competitive effect on franchisees or
franchisors, the section cannot be founded solely on competitive con-
siderations.
An alternative rationale for the section's ban on "discrimination" in
franchise terms could be the concept of fairness-the notion that it is
unfair for one franchisee to be subject to less favorable terms than
those obtained by other franchisees. But it is not at all clear that
"most-favored-nation" treatment has become such an accepted part of
marketplace morality that it should be enacted into law. Further-
more, any such ban on "discrimination" arguably may have adverse
economic consequences. A franchisor, for example, may wish to alter
its royalty and other charges according to market conditions at partic-
ular sites, charging more at the productive than unproductive sites.
Forced to adopt a single royalty structure or at least to bear the
burden of justifying any differences, many franchisors simply may not
grant franchises at the lean sites.428 The result may be less than op-
timal utilization of the franchisor's system.429
The lack of a clear legislative purpose will make construction and
application of section 18(2)(c) difficult. For example, would the adop-
tion and use of a graduated royalty schedule (i.e., one that varies with
the gross revenue) constitute discrimination? Although the same roy-
alty structure is offered to all, in practice it would have a different
impact on high and low volume franchisees. If use of such a royalty
rate schedule is discriminatory, is it nevertheless reasonable and justi-
fiable?
The requirement of section 18(2)(c) that franchisors treat all fran-
chisees equally in the enforcement of terms and exercise of reserved
powers presents fewer problems. It may be used effectively by fran-
chisees as a shield against arbitrary or predatory franchisor decisions
regarding, for example, the enforcement of franchise terms, the nonre-
newal or termination of franchises, and the withholding of consent to
a transfer by the franchisee. One interpretive problem with section
428. For example, section 18(2)(c) may endanger any affirmative program by a
franchisor to promote minority-owned franchises by altering royalty and other financial
arrangements. See generally Harris and Macchiarola, Increased Franchising Opportuni-
ties for Minorities: Some Legal Options, 16 CATHOLIC LAWYER 326 (1970).
429. For a general discussion of price discrimination in patent licensing, see Bax-
ter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis,
76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966). Much of Baxter's discussion applies equally to discrimination
in franchise trademark licensing.
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18(2)(c) relates to its interstate application. The section may be con-
strued to require nondiscrimination only among franchisees within
Washington, or it may be construed to require nondiscrimination be-
tween all franchisees wherever located. The latter construction seems
preferable and presumably would have been adopted expressly by the
legislature if it had considered the matter.
4. Exclusive Territories
Section 18(2)(f) prohibits a franchisor from granting competitive
franchises or from directly competing in any exclusive territory specif-
ically granted to a franchisee. As originally enacted, the section re-
quired franchisors to grant exclusive territories.430 The 1972 amend-
ment altered the provision so that an exclusive territory need not be
granted, but once granted it must be respected.43' The amendment
also changed the disclosure provisions to require an explicit statement
as to whether exclusive territories have been granted.432 Since the
normal expectation is that a franchise is exclusive to some degree, in
case of a dispute the burden should be on the franchisor to show that
the prospective franchisee understood that the franchise was not ex-
clusive. Thus, section 18(2)(f) merely makes available to a franchisee
the remedies of the Franchise Act for franchisor conduct that presum-
ably also constitutes a breach of the franchise contract.
5. Releases and Waivers of Liability
Section 18(2)(g) prohibits franchisors from requiring a franchisee
to "assent to a release, assignment, novation, or waiver which would
relieve any person from liability imposed by this chapter. '433 This sec-
tion presumably was intended only to invalidate releases which a fran-
chisee was coerced or unfairly pressured into signing and should not
430. Ch. 252, § 18(2)(f) [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
431. Ch. 116, § 10(2)(f) [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
432. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.030(4)(a)(xvii) (Supp. 1972); see WASH. AD. CODE §
460-80-130(23) (1972).
433. This section invalidating waivers of liability should be compared with section
22 of the Act which voids "any provision purporting to bind any person acquiring a
franchise.., to waive compliance" with the Franchise Act. WASH. REV. CODE §
19.100.220 (Supp. 1972), discussed at notes 508-12 and accompanying text infra.
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be read as barring voluntary settlements of claims after negotiations in
good faith.
6. Standards of Franchisee Conduct
Section 18(2)(h) prohibits franchisors from imposing on franchisees
"by contract, rule, or regulation, whether written or oral, any stan-
dard of conduct unless the franchisor can sustain the burden of
proving such to be reasonable and necessary." This section could
prove troublesome in its operation. Franchisors frequently prescribe
in minute detail the manner in which their franchisees shall do busi-
ness. 434 The reason expressed by franchisors for doing so is to ensure
"a substantial uniformity in the quality, type, and standards of prod-
ucts, services and manner of operations" in all the franchisor's out-
lets.435 This uniformity is considered essential to the goodwill of the
entire franchise system and to some extent is required to preserve the
validity of the franchisor's trademark.436
Sound business practice justifies many requirements imposed by
franchisors. Others, however, can be justified solely by the franchisor's
interest in uniformity. In light of section 18(2)(h), a standard of con-
duct justified solely on the ground of uniformity can neither be sum-
marily dismissed nor completely accepted as a justification.
Perhaps the best approach is to weigh the competing interests.
Under such an approach, the courts would balance the need for a
standard to establish uniformity and to preserve the goodwill of the
franchise system with the burden imposed upon the franchisee. Fol-
lowing the lead of decisions under the Automobile Dealers Act, the
courts might scrutinize those standards imposed primarily for the ben-
efit of the franchisor more carefully than those imposed for the mutual
benefit of the parties. 437 For example, one constant complaint is that
franchisors require franchisees to remain open for business during
434. For example, the standard agreement of a well-known ice cream franchisor
requires among other things that the franchisee not change the initial store layout
without permission, use approved clean uniforms, not permit smoking or gum chewing
by employees, display a birthday sign and sign-up cards, not allow coin-operated
vending machines on the premises, and paint the interior every two years with colors
selected by the franchisor. Baskin-Robbins 31 Ice Cream Store Franchise Agreement §§
9-11.
435. Baskin-Robbins 31 Ice Cream Store Agreement § 10.
436. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
437. See text accompanying notes 157-60 supra.
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unreasonable hours. Long hours during unprofitable periods increase
to some extent the gross revenue and, hence, the franchisor's royalty,
but provide little return to the franchisee for his time. Since such a
clause primarily benefits the franchisor and does not seem critical to
any interest in uniformity, the courts should subject such provisions to
higher standards of reasonableness than clauses relating to the appear-
ance of the premises and the like.
7. Refusals to Renew
Section 18(2)(i) provides that a franchisor may refuse to renew a
franchise only if it pays the franchisee the fair market value of the
inventory, supplies, equipment, and furnishings purchased from the
franchisor and the good will of the franchise.438 However, the fran-
chisor need not pay for the good will if it (1) gives one year's notice of
nonrenewal, and (2) agrees in writing not to enforce any covenant
which restrains the franchisee from competing with the franchisor. 43 9
"Good will" is not defined by the Franchise Act, and its usage in
the law is both elusive and variable.4 40 In financial and accounting
practice, "good will" normally refers to the excess amount paid for a
going business over the value of the several assets of the business.441
Good will exists when the estimated present value of the business'
future earnings exceeds the value of its specific assets. Accordingly, the
"good will" of a franchise would be derived by determining the fair
market value of the franchise business as a whole (or, if no market
value can be determined, by capitalizing the earnings of the fran-
chise)442 and then subtracting the value of the specific assets. 443 The
438. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)(i) (Supp. 1972). The franchisor need not
purchase "personalized materials which have no value to the franchisor," nor "inven-
tory, supplies, equipment and furnishings not reasonably required in the conduct of the
business." The franchisor also may offset amounts owed to it by the franchisee.
439. The required agreement presumably would relate only to a covenant not to
engage in the same line of business in the same area. The franchisor would continue to
be able to enforce covenants not to use its trademark, tradename, and distinctive mer-
chandising methods.
440. See Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 660
(1953).
441. See de Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1001,
1081-83 (1962).
442. If the franchisee normally works full time in the franchise operation, the "earn-
ings" of the franchise should be the net after allowance of a reasonable salary.
443. If a renewal fee is required under the terms of the franchise agreement, the
computation of good will would take such a fee into account.
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value of "good will" so determined will depend on the duration of the
franchise, which presumably would be the normal renewal period. 444
It seems clear from the statute that the threat of having to pay for good
will is intended primarily to force the franchisor to give the franchisee
substantial advance notice of nonrenewal and to discourage enforce-
ment of covenants not to compete so that the franchisee can continue
in business individually or with another franchisor.
There are two significant problems with the requirement that the
franchisor purchase the inventory, supplies, equipment and furnish-
ings originally purchased by the franchisee from the franchisor. The
obvious purpose of the requirement is to prevent the unnecessary
hardship of burdening a franchisee with specialized items which are of
little value to him without the franchise but of significant value to the
franchisor. 445 There is no good reason for limiting the repurchase
requirement to items "purchased from the franchisor. ''446 Franchisors
will in many instances be able to evade the requirement by having
their franchisees purchase equipment and the like from independent
suppliers.
The second problem with the repurchase requirement concerns the
determination of "fair market value." For inventory and supplies, this
normally would be their cost. But there is often very little market for
second-hand equipment and furnishings, especially if it is highly spe-
cialized. 447 In some cases the franchise agreement may prescribe a
basis for determining the value of such equipment. 448 If the value so
determined is a reasonable one, it ought to be accepted as setting the
fair market value for purposes of section 18(2)(i).
Problems also are raised by the phrase "refuse to renew." With
some franchise arrangements, it may not be clear whether a fran-
chisor's action is a refusal to renew governed by section 18(2)(i) or a
444. See text accompanying note 450 infra.
445. Franchisors typically reserve an option to purchase equipment and supplies
from terminated franchisees. No similar option to require repurchase typically is given
the franchisee, however. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 27 (1969).
446. In this respect, section 18(2)(i) appears to be inconsistent with the termination
provision, section 18(2)0), discussed infra. The latter requires the franchisor to purchase
all the franchisee's inventory and supplies from whomever purchased, except the fran-
chisor need not purchase inventory and supplies not purchased from the franchisor if the
franchisee is to retain control of the premises.
447. See BROWN, supra note 445, at 27.
448. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins 31 Ice Cream Store Agreement § 23 (setting the re-
purchase price for equipment at cost less 25% depreciation the first year, 15% a year
thereafter, but in no event less than 30% of cost).
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termination governed by section 18(2)0). 449 Consider, for example, a
franchise which by its terms can be terminated by either party at will
or on specified notice. Although such action ordinarily would be de-
noted a "termination," 450 it would seem to be more analogous to a
"refusal to renew," considering the purposes of the two sections.45'
With other franchise arrangements, it may not be clear what consti-
tutes a "renewal." Consider a franchise granted for a ten-year period
with no reference to any renewal. If after the ten years the franchisor
offers to renew for two years, would that offer be a proper renewal
or must the franchisor offer to renew for a period equal to the original
term? The general expectation of parties entering into franchise trans-
actions is probably that a "renewal" be for a full period.
8. Terminations
Section 18(2)0) provides that a franchisor may not terminate a
franchise prior to the expiration of its term except for "good cause. '452
"Good cause" includes "without limitation," noncompliance with
"lawful material provisions of the franchise agreement. '45 3 The fran-
chisor must give written notice of any default and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to cure454 unless the cause of termination is the franchisee's in-
solvency, voluntary abandonment of the business, or conviction of
violating a law relating to the franchise business. Upon termination
for good cause, the franchisor must purchase the franchisee's inven-
tory and supplies at fair market value.455
449. The difference may be critical since a "termination" must be for good cause
while a refusal to renew needs no cause so long as fair compensation and/or proper no-
tice is given by the franchisor.
450. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(3).
451. Section 18(2)G) refers to terminations of a franchise "prior to the expiration of
its term." A franchise of indefinite duration has no real "term" prior to the expiration of
which it can be terminated.
452. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.100.180(2)G) (Supp. 1972). This section, like the refusal
to renew section, was rewritten completely in the 1972 amendments. Ch. 116, § 10
[1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess.
453. To be "lawful" a provision must pass muster under the other provisions of sec-
tion 18(2). It is doubtful whether the requirement that a provision be "material" signif-
icantly limits a franchisor's ability to terminate. If a provision meets section 18(2)(h)'s
,easonableness-test, it would seem a fortiori to be "material."
454. The opportunity to cure "in no event need be more than thirty days" except
where the default cannot reasonably be cured in thirty days, in which case the franchisee
must initiate "substantial and continuing action to cure" the default within thirty days.
455. Unlike a franchisee refused renewal, a terminated franchisee thus may be left
with the specialized equipment and furnishings of the franchise.
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This "due process" approach to franchise terminations, coupled
with the other provisions of section 18(2), is a constructive solution to
the problems created by franchise terminations. 456 It does not inter-
fere with the franchisor's ability to enforce its contract, yet it frees the
franchisee from the fear of sudden, arbitrary termination or threat
thereof based on a failure to comply with one of the myriad require-
ments imposed by typical franchise agreements. 45 7
9. Chain Distributorships
Section 18(2)(k) prohibits anyone from promoting, offering, or
granting participation in a "chain distributor scheme. '458 "Chain dis-
tributor scheme" is defined as a sales device whereby one person,
upon making an investment, is granted the right to recruit other per-
sons who in turn, upon making an investment, are granted a similar
right to recruit other persons. 459 This provision was added by the
1972 amendments and logically does not belong either in section 18
or in the Franchise Act. It is clearly not, in the words of the preface to
the section, a specific "right" or "prohibition" governing "the relation
between the franchisor or subfranchisor and the franchisees." Rather,
it is an absolute proscription of a particular kind of sales device which
may or may not fit the definition of a franchise. It is a legislative re-
sponse to the growing number of fraudulent or near-fraudulent sales
devices, the most notorious of which is Glenn W. Turner's Dare to Be
Great scheme.460
Section 18(2)(k) probably does little more than gild the lily. Such
multi-level distributorships, unlike the typical franchise, are probably
"securities" which can be sold only in compliance with the registration
and antifraud rules of existing securities laws. 4 61
456. Many franchise agreements contain such notice-cure procedures although
usually not as generous to the franchisee. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins 31 Ice Cream Store
Agreement § 16 ("when feasible" notice of termination should allow ten days for the
franchisee "to cure the breach or default and to place himself in compliance.")
457. See note 438 supra.
458. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)(k) (Supp. 1972).
459. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.010(16) (Supp. 1972).
460. For a description of the Dare to Be Great scheme with its numerous "adven-
tures," see SEC v. Glenn W. Turner, No. 72-390 (D. Ore. 1972), BNA SEC. REG. & L.
REP., at H-1 (Sept. 13, 1972).
461. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner, supra note 460. The decision in Turner is
being appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. at 5 (Oct. 25, 1972).
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10. Constitutional Problems in Applying the Franchise Act
to Existing Franchises
The Franchise Act specifies that its provisions "shall be applicable
to all franchises and contracts existing between franchisors and fran-
chisees" as well as to all future franchises and contracts.462 Arguably,
application of the Fair Practices section to contract provisions which
were enforceable at the time of contract execution may run afoul of
the Washington and United States constitutional provisions forbidding
laws which impair the obligation of contracts. 463
The propriety of applying dealer or franchise legislation to existing
agreements has been considered in two recent decisions. In Fornaris v.
Ridge Tool Co.,464 a federal court of appeals considered a Puerto
Rico statute which prohibited terminations or nonrenewal of dealer-
ships except for "just cause" (defined as nonperformance of essential
obligations by the dealer) and which provided that damages for viola-
tion of the statute should include, without mitigation, the full good
will of the business plus an amount equal to five years' profits. The
court held that the statute could not be applied constitutionally to a
dealership contract signed prior to the enactment of the statute under
which the manufacturer reserved the right to cancel without cause. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment with
directions to the lower court to abstain until the Puerto Rican courts
had an opportunity to construe the statute in the light of the constitu-
tional problems. 465 The Court stated: "It is conceivable that 'just
cause' might be judicially confined to a more narrow ambit which
would avoid all constitutional questions. '466 The Supreme Court did
not indicate whether it agreed with the First Circuit's analysis of the
constitutional question.
In Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.,467 the Delaware
Supreme Court considered the question of whether that state's Fran-
462. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.900 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
463. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 23. See generally Hale, The
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1-3), 57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 621, 852
(1944); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 73 HIv. L. REv. 692 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considera-
tions in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1960).
464. 423 F.2d 563 (lstCir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
465. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
466. 400 U.S. at 44.
467. 281A.2d 19 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971).
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chise Security Law, which prohibited terminations except for "just
cause," could be applied to existing agreements. The court held that
such application would violate the contract clause of the United States
Constitution since the statute, unlike the terms of the actual agree-
ment, imposed an obligation to deal with a franchisee indefinitely and
levied penalty damages on franchisors who terminated without just
cause.
468
Section 18 of the Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act
is distinguishable from the statutes examined in Globe Liquor and
Fornaris. Both decisions recognized that minor alterations in existing
franchise contracts imposed through exercise of the state's police
power are permissible. As the federal court of appeals in Fornaris
emphasized: "Essentially, the question is, how drastically have prop-
erty rights been affected, and particularly, how great is the change
viewed in the light of the reasonable expectations of the parties when
the contract was entered into. '469 In addition, both decisions stressed
the indefinite tenure which the two statutes appeared to grant to fran-
chisees and the severe measure of damages imposed for improper ter-
minations.
An examination of section 18 reveals that most of its provisions do
not impose severe burdens on franchisors. The renewal and termina-
tion provisions do not grant indefinite tenure to franchisees;470 the
franchisor is free to refuse to renew or to terminate for breach of con-
tract so long as reasonable notice is given. An obligation to repurchase
materials is imposed only if the materials are of value to the fran-
chisor and only at the fair market price. Damages can be recovered
only if proven. 471 The provisions on franchisor control over sources of
supply, unreasonable prices, and "kick-backs" deal with practices
which are at best on the fringe of illegality under the federal antitrust
468. The court also held that penalty damages, which included both good will and a
sum not less than five times annual profits, could not be imposed constitutionally on
franchisors entering into agreements after the effective date of the law, since they consti-
tuted the "taking of private property without compensation and without due process of
law." 281 A.2d at 24. On the other hand, both Globe Liquor and Fornaris upheld the
"just cause" requirement for termination against arguments that it was unconstitu-
tionally vague.
469. 423 F.2d at 567.
470. See text accompanying notes 438-57 supra.
471. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.100.190(1), 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972), discussed at notes
500-05 and accompanying text infra.
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laws.472 The ban on "discrimination" may present greater problems if
interpreted as calling for a reduction in discriminatorily high royalty
rates .473
In short, no wholesale judgment should be made as to the constitu-
tionality of applying section 18 to existing franchises. Section 18
should apply to such franchises unless the franchisor can show that
under the particular circumstances such application has the effect of
imposing a substantial economic burden that could not reasonably
have been expected at the time of execution of the contract. Such ex-
pectations must be deemed to include knowledge of the growing trend
in the law to require fair treatment of franchisees and dealers. 474
E. Remedies
1. Public Remedies
The Franchise Act authorizes the state, through the attorney gen-
eral, to bring an action to restrain any conduct made unlawful by the
Act.47 5 Violation of an injunction carries a civil penalty of up to
$25,000.476 Furthermore, a civil penalty not to exceed $2000 can be
imposed upon persons for making any untrue statement in a docu-
ment filed with the director or for violating: (1) the registration re-
quirement, (2) the requirement that an offering circular be delivered
to prospective franchisees, (3) the requirement that persons offering
franchises keep books and records and fie records with the director,
(4) any order of the director, or (5) the antifraud provision.477 The
attorney general is authorized to accept written "assurances of discon-
tinuance" by persons. Failure to comply with such assurance is made
prima facie evidence of violation of the Act.478 Moreover, any willful
violation of the Act is criminally punishable by fine up to $5000
and/or imprisonment up to 10 years. 479
472. See text accompanying notes 182-95, 416-25 supra.
473. See text accompanying note 426 supra.
474. See text accompanying notes 137-47 supra.
475. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.210(1) (Supp. 1972).
476. Id. § 19.100.210(2).
477. Id.
478. Id. The provision is taken from the Consumer Protection Act. WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.86.100 (Supp. 1972).
479. Id. § 19.100.210(3).
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2. Private Civil Remedies
(a) Violations in Connection with Sales of Franchises. Section
19(2) of the Act provides that "any person who sells or offers to sell a
franchise in violation of this Act shall be liable to the franchisee or
subfranchisor who may sue at law or in equity for damages caused
thereby for rescission or other relief as the court may deem appro-
priate. '480 Recoverable damages are the "actual damages sustained"
which, in the court's discretion, may be increased to an amount not
exceeding three times the actual damages sustained. 481 The court also
has discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party.482
Two different types of violations in connection with the sale of
franchises can trigger the remedy provision. The first occurs when an
offer or sale is in violation of the Act but no misrepresentation or de-
ception has been practiced; examples include improperly registered
sales or a franchisor's failure to deliver a required offering circular. 483
In such a case, rescission is the appropriate remedy and is made avail-
able by the Act regardless of what either the defendant or the plaintiff
knew or should have known.484 In addition to rescission, section 19(2)
seems to allow an alternative recovery of damages for this type of vio-
lation. It is not clear what measure of damages is intended or how a
franchisee can show that this type of violation caused him damage. 485
The second type of violation occurs when the seller has practiced
some kind of misrepresentation or deception on the franchisee which
480. Id. § 19.100.190(2). The "at law or in equity" language presumably is intended
to give the franchisee-plaintiff an unfettered choice between trial by jury or by the court.
481. Id. § 19.100.190(3). For possible constitutional problems created by treble
damages, see note 468 supra.
482. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.190(3) (Supp. 1972). The Act originally provided
for a mandatory award of reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing franchisee plaintiff
with no provision for an award to a prevailing franchisor. Ch. 252, § 19(3) [1971] Wash.
Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. It was changed to allow a discretionary award to either party by the
1972 amendments. Ch. 116, § 11 [ 1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. This change seems un-
wise. Since a franshisor normally has greater resources than a franchisee, the prospect
of being charged with the defendant's attorneys' fees undoubtedly will deter many
franchisees but few franchisors from seeking access to the courts to enforce their
rights.
483. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.100.020, .080 (Supp. 1972).
484. Rescission is the private civil remedy imposed for unlawful sales of securities
under both the state and federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1972).
485. Neither the state nor the federal securities laws provides a damage measure of
recovery for unlawful sales.
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constitutes a violation of section 17.486 Again, rescission is available
as a remedy.487 Two defenses are provided in an action for rescission
based on section 17. The defendant may prove (1) "that the plaintiff
knew the facts concerning the untruth or omission" or (2) "that the
defendant exercised reasonable care and did not know or if he had
exercised reasonable care would not have known of the untruth or
omission. 488 The inclusion of the first defense implies that reliance
need not be shown by the plaintiff-franchisee in order to recover.489
Knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the falsity (and hence a lack
of reliance) must be shown by way of defense. The second defense,
lack of knowledge by the franchisor, makes the statutory remedy of
rescission actually less favorable to the franchisee than the common
law remedy of rescission490 which remains available since the Act
specifies that its remedies "shall be cumulative and nonexclusive and
shall not affect any other remedy. '491
As an alternative to rescission as a remedy for misrepresentation,
the franchisee can seek damages-which the court may treble in its
discretion. Following the existing rule in Washington, 492 damages
would be measured by the "loss of bargain" rule, the difference be-
tween the actual value of what the franchisee received and the value it
would have had if it had been as represented.
In view of the statutory command that the franchisee may recover
such "relief as the court may deem appropriate," the courts should not
view "damages" and "recission" as the sole or mutually exclusive
measures of relief. A franchise transaction, involving as it does the
486. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.170 (Supp. 1972), discussed at notes 397-403
supra.
487. In view of the Franchise Act's purpose to curb sales practice abuses and pro-
vide effective relief to deceived franchisees, the statutory remedy of rescission should
not be encrusted with such restrictive common law doctrines as laches and ratification.
See text accompanying note 50 supra.
488. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.190(2) (Supp. 1972). The two exceptions are sim-
ilar to section 12(2) of the federal Securities Act of 1933, the express remedy for securi-
ties sales fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
489. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31301 (West Supp. 1972) which requires the franchisee
to prove that he was relying upon a challenged statement when he purchased the fran-
chise.
490. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra. With survival of common law re-
scission, a franchisee induced by misrepresentation has a choice of remedies: common
law rescission with a reliance element, restrictive doctrines of laches and ratification but
no lack of knowledge of falsity defense; and statutory rescission with no affirmative reli-
ance element or laches-ratification but a lack of knowledge defense.
491. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.910 (Supp. 1972).
492. See note 46 supra.
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commitment of the buyer's time as well as his assets, should not be
treated like an ordinary sale of real or personal property. In the
leading case of Runyan v. Pacific Air Industries, Inc.493 the California
Supreme Court approved an award to a defrauded franchisee which
combined both rescissionary relief and consequential damages. The
franchisee received the franchise fee plus the lost income which he
would have earned on a job he surrendered to undertake the franchise
less the gross income received under the franchise and less an allow-
ance for the value of benefits conferred on the franchisee by the fran-
chisor.494 The approach of Runyan should be followed in applying
section 19(2).
Section 19(2) unfortunately fails to particularize the persons who
are liable to a franchisee for sales violations. Most comparable stat-
utes impose liability not only on the seller but also on controlling per-
sons; partners, officers and directors; employees and broker-dealers;
and salesmen who materially aid the sale.495 As a defense such non-
sellers may show that "in the exercise of reasonable care [they] could
not have known of the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist. '496 Under the Franchise Act, liability is
extended to those "who sell or offer to sell a franchise," a provision
expanded somewhat by section 16 which subjects to the Act those per-
sons who "engage directly or indirectly in the sale or offer to sell a
franchise. '497 Since the omission of a provision particularizing the
persons liable appears to have been a technical oversight, the courts
should not hesitate to construe sections 16 and 19 broadly enough to
impose liability for misrepresentation on all persons participating in
the sale and especially upon parent corporations which engage in
franchising through subsidiaries.
Since no statute of limitations is provided for actions under section
493. 2 Cal. 3d 304, 85 Cal. Rptr. 138, 466 P.2d 682 (1970).
494. The rule on measuring the amount of offset allowed to a franchisor for the
value of benefits conferred on the franchisee does not seem to be clearly established. In
Runyan, the court allowed no offset since it found that the franchisor had already re-
couped the expenditures and rental value in question. In Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1972) the court disallowed any offset for
real estate and equipment rental during the period of the franchise.
495. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(2) (Supp. 1972) (the state securities
act); CAL. CORP. CODE § 31302 (West Supp. 1972) (the California Franchise Investment
Law).
496. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(2) (Supp. 1972); CAL. CORP. CODE § 31302
(West Supp. 1972).
497. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.160 (Supp. 1972).
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19(2), the general statute of limitations for an "action for relief upon
the ground of fraud" presumably applies. This statute provides for a
three year limitation period with the cause of action not accruing
"until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud. ' 498 In this respect, the limitations period is more favorable to
the franchisee than the equivalent period under the state securities act,
which is three years with no extension for reasonable failure to dis-
cover the fraud.499
(b) Violations of the Fair Practices Section. Section 18(2) provides
that a violation of its specific prohibitions shall be an "unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice or an unfair method of competition. '500 In
turn, section 19(1) provides that such unfair or deceptive acts shall
constitute the same "under the provisions of chapter 19.86 of the Re-
vised Washington Code," the state's Consumer Protection Act.5 01 The
Consumer Protection Act provides for civil actions for damages
and/or injunctive relief.5 02 A plaintiff may obtain an award for reason-
able attorneys' fees, and the court may increase the award of damages
up to an amount not to exceed the lesser of three times the actual
damages sustained or $1000.503 An action for damages must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. 504
The very nature of the rights and prohibitions of section 18 often
will indicate the appropriateness of injunctive relief either alone or in
combination with a damage award. For example, injunctive relief will
be the normal remedy for an improper termination or threat of termi-
nation. Cases under the federal antitrust laws and the federal Automo-
bile Dealers Act will provide helpful precedents in resolving questions
such as the propriety of a preliminary injunction and the scope of the
franchisee's obligations during the pendency of the action.505
3. Arbitration Agreements
A question apparently not considered by the legislature is the effect
498. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080(4) (1959).
499. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(3); see also Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invest-
ments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971).
500. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2) (Supp. 1972).
501. Id. § 19.100.190(1).
502. Id. § 19.86.090.
503. Id.
504. Id. § 19.86.120.
505. See text accompanying notes 170-72, and 198-99 supra.
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of the Franchise Act and its remedial provisions upon agreements to
arbitrate in franchise contracts. State506 and federal507 statutes
broadly validate agreements by parties to arbitrate present or future
controversies. Could an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement be
enforced to compel a franchisee to submit to arbitration of a claim
grounded upon misrepresentation in the sale of the franchise or a vio-
lation of the provisions of the Fair Practices Section, section 18(2)?
The closest authority is the United States Supreme Court case of
Wilko v. Swan.508 In Swan, a customer brought an action under the
Securities Act of 1933 for damages based on fraud in connection with
the purchase of securities committed by the defendant stockbroker.
Although the defendant contended that the relationship between the
parties was controlled by an arbitration agreement, the Court held
that section 14 of the Securities Act,509 which voids any provision
"binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision" of the Securities Act, invalidated the arbitration clause.
Thus, the plaintiff could seek the express judicial remedy created by
the Securities Act despite the existence of the arbitration clause and
the United States Arbitration Act.510 Section 22 of the Franchise Act
is virtually identical to section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933.5 11 If
the reasoning of Swan is followed by the Washington courts, the judi-
cial remedies of the Franchise Act will supersede any agreement to
arbitrate.512
Arguably, the legislature should have considered arbitration as a
desirable mechanism for resolving disputes between franchisor and
franchisee-especially the kinds of disputes dealt with in the Fair
506. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04.010 (Supp. 1972).
507. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
508. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
509. 15 U.S.C. § 7n (1970).
510. See also A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.
1968); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d
223 (1968) (antitrust claims not arbitrable).
511. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.220 (Supp. 1972).
512. A delicate problem in federalism arises when a franchise agreement constitutes
a contract involving interstate commerce. The United States Arbitration Act applies to
such contracts, and it can be argued that that Act preempts any state law (such as the
Franchise Act) which attempts to preclude arbitration. Swan, which relied on the parity
of two federal statutes, the Securities Act and the United States Arbitration Act, would
not apply where federal and state statutes appear to conflict. On this general question,
see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Note, Commercial Arbitration in
Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. REV. 607 (1967).
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Practices Section of the Franchise Act. One commentator has argued
that arbitration fairly conducted can be less disruptive of the con-
tinuing relationship between franchisor and franchisee than litigation,
provided it is binding on both parties and not just the franchisor.513
CONCLUSION
Franchising as a marketing system offers both economic and social
advantages as an alternative to the continued growth of large, verti-
cally-integrated corporations. It fosters the birth of new industries and
of new competition within existing industries while perpetuating local
ownership and management of small business. The role of the legal
system should be to create an atmosphere in which franchising can
realize these fundamental advantages. A critical part of such an at-
mosphere is public confidence--confidence that franchise opportuni-
ties are promoted on the basis of solid value and not inflated or dis-
torted promises, confidence that an investor in a franchise opportunity
will not be subject to arbitrary or oppressive control.
The Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act is a positive
step taken to assure continued public confidence in franchising. Un-
fortunately, the statutory scheme contains intended and unintended
loopholes, gaps in coverage, and other deficiencies that may dilute or
negate entirely its purpose. These flaws should be cured by legislative
amendment. Further, the Washington Securities Division, charged
with administration of the Act, should be given the expanded re-
sources necessary for effective enforcement. 514 But even if these steps
are taken, it appears doubtful whether state legislation can ever be an
adequate approach to a national problem such as franchising. Strin-
513. See Rudnick, Arbitration of Disputes Between Franchisors and Franchisees,
55 ILL. BJ. 54, 62-63 (1966); but see Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship,
49 TEx. L. REv. 650, 662(1971).
While the bill introduced by Senator Hart in the 9 Ist Congress on "Fairness in Fran-
chising" provided ajudicial remedy for franchise terminations not made in good faith, it
also allowed binding arbitration of disputes concerning terminations so long as neither
the standard of good cause nor the allowable compensation to a franchisee was less than
that provided in the bill. S. 1967, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969). The Hart bill could have
served as a model for a similar provision in the Washington Franchise Act.
In a recent proposed complaint, the FTC announced that it was considering requiring
gasoline companies to alter their station leases so that (1) they would be subject to can-
cellation only for good cause and (2) the question of good cause would have to be sub-
mitted to arbitration. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 7, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
514. The Securities Division was understaffed even prior to being given responsi-
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gent local regulation has the laudable effect of deterring the entry of
worthless and fraudulent franchise promotions. However, by raising
the effective cost of doing business in the state, such regulation also
may deter the entry of solid franchise opportunities at least until the
markets in states without such regulation have become saturated.
Needed is the development of minimum federal standards governing
franchising to reduce any such competitive disadvantage. The pattern
of concurrent state and federal regulation has been reasonably suc-
cessful in the area of securities sales and should likewise be so in the
area of franchising.
390
bility for the Franchise Act. See Rooks, supra note 313, at 192-95. Indeed, the office has
tended to be a profit maker-taking in more in fees than its budget. The pattern in
Washington seems to be to give new tasks to the Securities Division almost continually.
See, e.g., Ch. 106 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. (statute regulating promotion of
camping clubs).
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